Demographics And Distrust: The Eleventh Circuit On Graduation Prayer In \u3cem\u3eAdler V. Duval Count\u3c/em\u3ey by Horwitz, Paul
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 63 
Number 3 Volume 63 Number 3 (April 2009) Article 8 
4-1-2009 
Demographics And Distrust: The Eleventh Circuit On Graduation 
Prayer In Adler V. Duval County 
Paul Horwitz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul Horwitz, Demographics And Distrust: The Eleventh Circuit On Graduation Prayer In Adler V. Duval 
County, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 835 (2009) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol63/iss3/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
Demographics and Distrust: The Eleventh
Circuit on Graduation Prayer in
Adler v. Duval County
PAUL HORWITZt
ABSTRACT
This Article, a contribution to a symposium on the constitutional
jurisprudence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, focuses on the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Adler v. Duval
County. Adler involved a policy that permitted students to vote on
whether to deliver opening and/or closing "messages" at high school
graduation ceremonies. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the
policy against an Establishment Clause challenge. After the Supreme
Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, which outlawed a similar
policy in the context of high school football games, the court, insisting
that Santa Fe was distinguishable, again upheld Duval County's policy.
I argue that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Adler was wrong, and
indeed can be seen as little more than an act of willful resistance to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Fe.
Beyond this simple doctrinal criticism, however, this Article sug-
gests that both Santa Fe and Adler are fruitful subjects of study for what
they say about two issues that have drawn relatively little sustained and
serious attention: the role of majoritarian elections within the Establish-
ment Clause, and the relationship between the Establishment Clause and
the demographics of religion in local communities. I argue that John
Hart Ely's representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review,
presented in his influential work Democracy and Distrust, can contribute
significantly to our understanding of both of these issues. In the first
case, Ely's theory shows why majoritarian election processes that permit
or encourage school prayer cannot generally insulate schools from
Establishment Clause challenges. In the second, I argue that Ely's theory
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can help dislodge the usual baseline assumptions about the religious plu-
ralism of the United States, which are accurate at the national level but
collapse at the level of the overwhelmingly religiously homogeneous
local communities in which many Establishment Clause cases arise. On
this understanding, I argue that, contrary to some recent arguments, the
Establishment Clause might best be understood as being more properly
concerned with state and local establishments of religion than with fed-
eral establishments of religion.
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INTRODUCTION
I was proud to serve as a law clerk on the Eleventh Circuit in
1998-99. I was happy to contribute to the work of the court, fortunate in
finding lifelong friends in my co-clerks, and especially grateful to the
judge for whom I clerked, the Honorable Ed Carnes, for the opportunity
to learn a great deal in his chambers.
Gratitude is not the same thing as obsequiousness, however, and it
must be said that every now and then a good court can get things quite
wrong. So it is with the decision I will discuss here.
The Eleventh Circuit's en-banc decision in 2001 in the case of
Adler v. Duval County School Board' was actually the second occasion
on which the full court erred. In the same case a year earlier, the en-banc
court upheld a school-district policy that submitted to a student vote the
question of whether to have a student volunteer give a short opening or
closing message at high school graduation exercises in Duval County,
Florida.2 The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded it to
the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.3
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit did not budge an inch. Santa Fe, it
1. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001).
2. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler 111), 206 F.3d 1070 (11 th Cir. 2000), vacated,
531 U.S. 801 (2000).
3. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). See Adler, 531 U.S. 801 (2000).
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said, "does not alter the outcome of this case."4 The high school gradua-
tion "message" policy-and let us now call it what it is, a high school
graduation prayer policy-remained permissible. The votes changed:
Two additional judges joined the two judges who had dissented from the
earlier en-banc judgment. The result did not.
In this Article, I argue that the dissenters had the better of the argu-
ment. Both before the Supreme Court's ruling in Santa Fe, and even
more clearly after it, Duval County's graduation prayer policy was
unconstitutional, a victim not only of the circumstances of its promulga-
tion but also of the mechanics of the policy itself. The policy plainly,
and with a plain intent, accomplished what the Establishment Clause
forbids: to use the power and resources of the state to hold the exercise
of religious belief hostage to the will of a political majority.
It is especially fitting that I should have an opportunity to address
the Eleventh Circuit's error in Adler v. Duval County in the University of
Miami Law Review. The University of Miami School of Law was privi-
leged to have a long association with one of the giants of constitutional
law scholarship, the late John Hart Ely.5 Ely's signal contribution to
constitutional law scholarship, the classic Democracy and Distrust,6
mounted a powerful rearguard defense of the Warren Court that sought
to find a coherent principle behind that Court's decisions. That principle,
representation-reinforcement, holds that the Court's fundamental work
under the Constitution is to safeguard "the basic democratic theory of
our government."7 One way it does so is to ensure that, where funda-
mental rights are concerned, there are no permanent minorities. If the
channels of political change are to remain clear and function properly,
the majority cannot exercise its will in ways that create a lasting division
between the "ins" and "outs." Democracy and Distrust remains, in the
words of one appreciative but critical writer, "the single most perceptive
justificatory account of the work of the Warren Court and arguably of
modern constitutional law more broadly." 8
One could heartily wish that the majority of the Eleventh Circuit
judges in Adler v. Duval County had consulted their copies of Ely's clas-
sic. If they had, I will argue, they would have seen their way clear to a
sound resolution of the case. In particular, Ely's invaluable work helps
4. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1332.
5. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, John Hart Ely: Fathers and Sons, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 953
(2004); Clark Freshman, Behind the Process: Remembering John Ely's Compassion, 58 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 955 (2004); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Ely's Gifts, 58 U. MIAMI. L. REv. 961 (2004).
6. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
7. Id. at 45.
8. Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237, 1238
(2005).
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illuminate two aspects of both Adler and Santa Fe, which were central to
those cases but have not yet received enough sustained critical attention.
First, Ely's focus on representation-reinforcement helps us to
understand a critical piece of the puzzle surrounding "voluntary" stu-
dent-led prayer at graduations and other school ceremonies: why the use
of majoritarian processes, such as student referenda, often will not and
should not insulate a graduation prayer policy from constitutional attack,
and what sort of processes might permit student prayers.9
Second, Ely's work helps us to achieve a better grasp of the real
world of Establishment Clause challenges. It reminds us that although
ours is a deeply religiously pluralistic nation, that pluralism is not
equally distributed in every part of the country. Although we tend to
think of Establishment Clause cases, and the nation itself, as an undiffer-
entiated whole, Ely's focus on democratic representation and the Consti-
tution helps remind us that in many regions, the overwhelming majority
of the population belongs to one faith, and dissenters from that faith are
a tiny minority. That fact, which often receives too little attention, 10 has
important implications. In areas that are genuinely religiously pluralistic,
and in which we might thus expect the most political division over relig-
ious questions, the political process is in fact most likely to achieve
working accommodations between various religious groups rather than
fomenting division. On the other hand, in areas that overwhelmingly
favor one religion, the political process, viewed through an Elysian lens,
is most likely to arrive at a policy that favors the majority and does the
most harm to the tiny religious minority, whose members are most likely
to face both official disapproval and unofficial harassment. A deeper
consideration of the demographics of religion is thus likely to say much
about both the real-world treatment of religious minorities (and majori-
ties) and the unevenness of American religious pluralism.
Part I sets out the facts and law of the Santa Fe case. Part II focuses
on the facts in Adler and the Eleventh Circuit's treatments of that case.
Part III critiques the Eleventh Circuit's final en-banc opinion in Adler in
light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Santa Fe. Part IV brings Ely into
the mix. After briefly introducing Ely's theory of representation-rein-
forcement and noting his sparse treatment of the Religion Clauses under
9. Although this aspect of Adler and Santa Fe has certainly received scholarly attention, I
find most of it unsatisfying. A singular exception, although I disagree with some of its
conclusions, is Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing
Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147 (2002). I discuss Brady's article at length below. See
infra Part IV.B.
10. The primary exception here is the work of Frank Ravitch. See, e.g., FRANK S. RAVITCH,




that theory, it suggests that Ely's work may lead to a better understand-
ing of both the failure of ersatz democratic processes to insulate school
prayer policies from constitutional challenge, and the real-world uneven-
ness of American religious pluralism.
. SANTA FE
The Santa Fe Independent School District is a political subdivision
representing about 4000 students in southern Texas. 1 The district,
according to some complaining residents of the district, had a tangled
history of Establishment Clause violations and the harassment of relig-
ious minorities. Its activities included the promotion of attendance at a
Baptist revival, the distribution of Bibles on school grounds, the encour-
agement of student membership in religious clubs, and "chastising chil-
dren who held minority religious beliefs."' 2 Among its policies, prior to
1995, was the creation of the elected post of student council chaplain,
responsible for "deliver[ing] a prayer over the public address system
before each varsity football game for the entire season. '"3
Following litigation over these matters in federal district court, the
school district adopted a series of new policies addressing student prayer
at school events. The first set of policies dealt with graduation prayers. It
provided, in its first iteration, that the senior class could "elect by secret
ballot to choose whether an invocation and benediction shall be part of
the graduation exercise."' 4 The policy provided that a "yes" vote on a
benediction or invocation would be followed by a student election to
select a student "to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations
and benedictions for the purpose of solemnizing their graduation cere-
monies."'" A subsequent version of the policy eliminated the language
requiring the prayers to be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing, but pro-
vided that the earlier policy would be effective in the event that the
district was enjoined from enforcing the later policy. 6
The second set of policies dealt with prayer at football games. It,
too, came in two iterations. The first, titled "Prayer at Football Games,"
also provided for two elections-one to determine whether to give an
invocation at football games, and the second to determine who would
deliver it. 7 It also provided that if, but only if, a court required it, the
11. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
12. Id. at 295.
13. Id. at 294.
14. Id. at 296.
15. Id. at 296-97.
16. Id. at 297.
17. Id.
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invocation should be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.' 8 The second
version of the policy omitted the word "prayer" from its title and talked
about "messages" and "statements" as well as invocations. 9
The district court held that the policies dealing with both gradua-
tion and football games violated the Establishment Clause. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit, over a dissent, affirmed the district court, in an opinion
that attempted to thread a path between two seemingly conflicting Fifth
Circuit precedents. In one case, the circuit had upheld a nonsectarian and
nonproselytizing student-led graduation prayer approved by student
vote.20 In the other, the court struck down a similar policy with respect
to football games, distinguishing its earlier ruling on the grounds that
football games were "far less solemn and extraordinary" than high
school graduations.2' The Fifth Circuit panel in Santa Fe emphasized
again that its graduation decision had "hinged on the singular context
and singularly serious nature of a graduation ceremony. Outside that
nurturing context, a [student-led prayer] [p]olicy cannot survive." 2 The
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, limited to the question
"[w]hether . . . student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games
violates the Establishment Clause[.]"23
Writing for a six-to-three Court, Justice Stevens held that it did. He
began by recognizing Justice O'Connor's earlier suggestion that "there
is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion,
which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."24 In
this case, the Court rejected the argument that the student-led prayer was
private speech. It pointed out that the "invocations are authorized by a
government policy and take place on government property at govern-
ment-sponsored school-related events."25 While the same might be said
of private speech in government-owned public fora, the Court concluded
that the fact that only one student was entitled to give the invocation
over the whole year rendered the policy far too selective and limited to
constitute a public forum.2 6
The Court then came to one of the distinctive features of the Santa
18. Id.
19. Id. at 298; the policy is set out in full at 298-99 n.6.
20. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
21. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir 1995).
22. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 823 (5th Cir. 1999).
23. Doe v. Santa Fe. Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 528 U.S. 1002 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-62).
24. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)) (emphasis in original).
25. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302.
26. Id. at 302-03.
[Vol. 63:835
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DISTRUST
Fe policy: its use of a student vote to decide whether to have graduation
speakers and to elect those speakers. Drawing on its recent opinion in
Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,7 the
Court suggested that "the majoritarian process implemented by the Dis-
trict" was "problematic," because it did "nothing to protect minority
views but rather places the students who hold such views at the mercy of
the majority."28 It suggested that the fact that students effectively voted
on the content of the message-an invocation-before voting on the
identity of the speaker distinguished it from an election process in which
the speech is not so constrained, such as the election of a prom king or
queen.29 It held that the fact that a majority of students approved of the
message did "nothing to protect the minority; indeed, it likely serves to
intensify their offense."3 ° It concluded with a flourish by quoting Justice
Jackson's statement in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette:
"[F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections."31
The Court also found that the election process did not sufficiently
insulate the school district from the religious content of the student invo-
cations, rejecting the district's argument that the election served as a
"circuit-breaker" separating the district from the speech.3" To the con-
trary, the Court believed that the district was intimately involved in the
speech, from the fact that the district had established the policy in the
first place to the fact that it mandated a particular form of speech-an
invocation, which common usage and local practice both suggested was
intended to be religious in nature. 33 Beyond this, a host of details tied
the government to the speech, in the Court's view: the fact that the
speech would be delivered at a regularly scheduled school event, the fact
that the government retained control over the public address system, and
the fact that the pregame ceremony would be "clothed in the traditional
indicia of school sporting events."34 All of these factors led to the con-
clusion that a reasonable objective observer would "unquestionably per-
ceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school's seal of
approval."35
The Court also held that its view of whether an endorsement had
27. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
28. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304.
29. Id. at 304-05 n.15.
30. Id. at 305.
31. Id. at 304-05 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
32. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305 (quotation and citation omitted).
33. See id. at 305-07.
34. Id. at 307-08.
35. Id. at 308.
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occurred in this case should be influenced by the "text and history of
[the] policy" at issue.3 6 As Justice Stevens wrote, "We refuse to turn a
blind eye to the context in which this policy arose, and that context
quells any doubt that this policy was implemented with the purpose of
endorsing school prayer."37 That context included the "evolution of the
current policy," under which the district had begun with an official
office of student chaplain and ended with a regulation "candidly titled
'Prayer at Football Games."' 38 And it included the surrounding back-
ground of the case, in which the district had been accused of a wide
range of practices endorsing the beliefs of the local religious majority
and scorning religious minorities.39
The Court's decision also turned on coercion. Its earlier decision in
Lee v. Weisman had rejected a school graduation-prayer policy in part on
the grounds that by expecting students to stand respectfully and silently
during the invocation, the policy effectively coerced religious practice.4n
The school district urged the Court to distinguish its policy from the
policy in Lee because both the majoritarian selection process and the
voluntary nature of attendance at football games rendered any prayer in
this case non-coercive. The Court rejected both arguments. As to the
first argument, it held that the very fact that the election process created
religious winners and losers within the district "encourages divisiveness
along religious lines in a public school setting" and puts at issue a debate
that the Establishment Clause intended to "remove ... from governmen-
tal supervision or control."'" On the second argument, it pointed out that
some students-players, band members, and others-are in fact required
to attend school football games, and in any event bowed to the reality (in
southern Texas, if not elsewhere) that high school football is of immense
importance to students and community members, and argued that stu-
dents and others ought not be put to the choice of attending and hearing
a religious speech or not attending at all.42
Finally, the Court responded to the objection that a ruling striking
down the policy would be premature at the facial challenge stage. On
this score, it concluded that some injuries had already occurred, regard-
less of the outcome of the vote, including the passage of the policy itself
and the implementation of an election process that "subjects the issue of
36. Id.
37. Id. at 315.
38. Id. at 309.
39. See id. at 315.
40. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
41. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310-11.
42. See id. at 311-12.
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prayer to a majoritarian vote."43 It held that as long as the policy itself
had an unconstitutional religious purpose, the "simple enactment of [the]
policy" would be unconstitutional. 44 It held that there was manifestly
such a purpose: that "every Santa Fe High School student understands
clearly [ ] that this policy is about prayer.
45
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an angry dissent on behalf of himself
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, charging that the Court's opinion "bris-
tles with hostility to all things religious in public life."4 6 Its central line
of attack was that the Court's ruling was premature. Given that the case
presented a facial challenge, the question before the Court should have
been whether the district's policy "inevitably will be" applied "in viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. 47
The Court's conclusions on this point were purely speculative,
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued. The election process itself left open the
possibility that students might vote not to have an invocation, or not to
give an expressly religious invocation. He added, however, that a clearer
record would be presented if the election process led "to a Christian
prayer before ninety percent of the football games. '"48 Moreover, the pol-
icy ensured, in the dissent's view, that any viewpoints expressed
belonged to the student speaker and not the government, and thus fell on
the private side of the public-private divide.49 And the Chief Justice
argued that taken on its face, the policy had a plausible secular pur-
pose-the solemnization of a school event-and thus could not be inju-
rious in itself.50 The dissent also rejected the Court's willingness to hold
the district's history against it, arguing instead that the district's efforts
to modify its policies suggested that the district "was acting diligently to
come within the governing constitutional law."'"
The dissent concluded that if the students had selected speakers
"according to wholly secular criteria," the policy would be constitutional
even if the private speech that resulted was religious.52 If, on the other
hand, the policy was "applied in an unconstitutional manner," there
would be time enough to act; but that time was not now.5 3
43. Id. at 314.
44. Id. at 316.
45. Id. at 315.
46. Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 321.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 321-22.
51. Id. at 323.
52. Id. at 324-25.
53. Id. at 326.
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II. ADLER
The Adler litigation involved the high school graduation practices
of Duval County, Florida. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lee
v. Weisman, the county school board had apparently permitted some
form of graduation prayer.54 After that decision, the board distributed a
memorandum suggesting that those practices would no longer be per-
missible." In response to some objections, the school superintendent
sought the advice of the school board's lawyer, who suggested that it
would be permissible "to allow student-initiated and student-led prayer
during the graduation ceremony so long as the administration and
faculty were not involved in the decision making process. '"56
Accordingly, in May 1993, the board's counsel sent around a mem-
orandum titled "Graduation Prayers."5" The memo began by noting that
the board had been "bombarded with information" suggesting that stu-
dent-initiated and student-led prayers would be constitutionally accept-
able.58 The memo stated, in pertinent part:
1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed
two minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest within
the discretion of the graduating senior class;
2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a student
volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduat-
ing senior class as a whole;
3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening and/or
closing message, the content of that message shall be prepared by
the student volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise
reviewed by [the] Duval County School Board, its officers or
employees;
The purpose of these guidelines is to allow the students to direct
their own graduation message without monitoring or review by
54. See Jessica Smith, "Student-Initiated" Prayer: Assessing the Newest Initiatives to Return
Prayer to the Public Schools, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 303, 312 (1996) ("For many years,
invocations, benedictions and other religious prayers or messages had been offered at Duval
County public high school graduations.") (citing Brief for National PEARL, et al. at 4 & n.6,
Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997) (No. 94-2638)).
55. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1344-45 n.l (11th Cir.
2001) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (quoting a memorandum recounting that following the Court
decision in Lee, the board stated that "we would no longer be able to have prayers at graduation
ceremonies").
56. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler 1), 851 F. Supp. 446, 448 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
57. Adler 1, 851 F. Supp. at 449. I will subsequently refer to the memorandum as the
Graduation Prayer Memo.
58. Id. For example, the High School Director for the First Baptist Church in Jacksonville
wrote the board's counsel thanking her "for being patient with me as I continue to 'fish' for ways
to incorporate prayer in our graduation ceremonies." Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler 11),




The policy was not directly subjected to deliberation by the school
board, but at a June 1993 meeting, the board debated a motion to substi-
tute a moment of silence for any student-initiated messages that might
result from the Graduation Prayer Memo. At that meeting, one board
member opposed the motion because, he said, "I cannot vote [in favor
of] silent meditation when we all know that in the past someone has
prayed out loud to thank the Lord."6° Another said,
God is not going away. Neither is our godly heritage .... Americans
who believe this have rights, too .... I ... believe that the democratic
process in which seniors were given the ability to choose which form
of inspirational message, if any, they wanted at their commencement
was an appropriate one and I'm going to stand by it.
61
A third, speaking in favor of the Graduation Prayer Memo as against the
silent meditation proposal, said,
In 1962, the Bible went out of the school and in 1992-93 the bullets
come in. You don't have to be a brain surgeon to figure out that['s]
where we're going in America .... [H]ow absurd are we going to
take these special interest groups that are fanning their particular
agenda at the expense of the best interest of this country?
62
A fourth member spoke more directly to the issue of the student election
process, arguing that "the only way we can keep ourselves clear on this
thing is to keep ourselves out of what happens in this area of the gradua-
tion ceremony. 63 Ultimately, the motion to substitute a moment of
silence failed by a four-to-three vote, and the policy set out in the Gradu-
ation Prayer Memo was retained.64
The county's high school principals acted accordingly, delegating
to their senior classes-the whole senior class in some cases, and select
groups of students in others-the decision whether to have a student
message and who should deliver it. 65 Of the seventeen high schools
involved, a clearly religious and prayerful message was delivered at ten
schools; at the other seven, either no message was given or the message
was secular in nature.
66
Following litigation, the district court granted summary judgment
59. Adler 1, 851 F. Supp. at 449.
60. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1346 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001)
(Kravitch, J., dissenting).
61. Adler I1, 174 F.3d at 1240 n.3.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler 1), 851 F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
65. See id.; see also id. at 449 n.4.
66. See id. at 449-50.
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for the defendants. Given the ongoing confusion in the lower courts
about what test to apply in Establishment Clause cases, it looked to both
the three-part test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman67 and the coercion test
set out in Lee v. Weisman.68 It found the policy acceptable under both
tests.69
Following some skirmishing over procedural issues, the case on the
merits reached the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed. Like the district
court, the panel applied both Lemon and Lee.7° Under Lee, it held that
"the delegation of the decision regarding a 'prayer' or 'message' to the
vote of graduating students does not erase the imprint of the state from
graduation prayer,"'" and concluded that the policy was nothing more
than "an attempt to circumvent Lee and continue the practice of prayer at
graduation ceremonies."72 It found that the school board "exerted tre-
mendous control over the graduation ceremonies" by planning and con-
trolling every aspect of the occasion.73 Even the student vote whether to
have a graduation message took place only "because school officials
agreed to let them decide that one question."74 Although the Graduation
Prayer Memo referred only to opening or closing "messages," the court
concluded in light of the circumstances that a two-minute message at the
opening or closing of a graduation ceremony was likely to be a prayer.
7 5
Ultimately, it concluded that "the state's control over nearly all aspects
of the graduation ceremony, and the choices of a student-elected repre-
sentative, subjects the ceremony to the limits of the Constitution," and
that "the state's endorsement of the prayer subjects it to a facial violation
of the Establishment Clause."76 Under the second question presented by
Lee-whether the prayer was coercive-the panel easily concluded that
the prayers, once attributed to the state, were indistinguishable from
those in Lee.7 7
The panel reached the same result applying the Lemon test. It held
that "the policy, both on its face and based upon the history surrounding
its inception, has an actual purpose to permit prayer-including secta-
67. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
68. See Adler 1, 851 F. Supp. at 450-51.
69. See id. at 451-56.
70. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler 11), 174 F.3d 1236, 1242 (1 1th Cir. 1999),
vacated, 531 U.S. 801 (2000).
71. Id. at 1244.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1479
(3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
75. See Adler H, 174 F.3d at 1245-46.




rian and proselytizing prayer-at graduation ceremonies."78 Similarly, it
held that the primary effect of the policy was "to permit prayer at gradu-
ation ceremonies," and that a reasonable observer would find that the
policy was in effect an extension of the board's pre-1992 policy of grad-
uation prayers, and thus that it constituted an endorsement of those
prayers even if they came as a result of a student vote.7 9 Judge Kravitch
filed a special concurrence to argue that the "grounds of the majority
opinion are quite narrow,"8 and to emphasize that student prayer that
was genuinely private in nature would meet a different fate under the
Establishment Clause.8'
Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the panel's opinion.
Judge Marcus, who had dissented from the panel's judgment, wrote for
the court. He characterized the case as asking "whether the Duval
County school system's policy of permitting a graduating student,
elected by her class, to deliver an unrestricted message of her choice at
the beginning and/or closing of graduation ceremonies is facially viola-
tive of the Establishment Clause."82 Put that way, he suggested, the con-
clusion was obvious: the Establishment Clause was not violated "merely
because an autonomous student speaker may choose to deliver a relig-
ious message.""
In framing the issue this way, Judge Marcus drew on language from
Justice Souter's concurrence in Lee, which suggested that that case
might have come out differently if the state "had chosen its graduation
day speakers according to wholly secular criteria."84 In Judge Marcus's
view, the policy contained in the Graduation Prayer memo met those
conditions. First, the policy "explicitly divorces school officials from the
decision-making process."85 Second, aside from requiring that the "mes-
sage" be delivered at the opening or closing of graduation and that it last
no longer than two minutes, the school retained no control over the con-
tent of that message.86 Third, the policy did not require, or even suggest,
"that the graduating class consider religious or any other criteria in
deciding whether to have a student message or in selecting a particular
78. Id. at 1249.
79. Id. at 1251.
80. Id. at 1252 (Kravitch, J., specially concurring).
81. See id. at 1252-53. Judge Marcus filed a dissent, see id. at 1256-71 (Marcus, J.,
dissenting), but because he authored the en-banc opinions for the Eleventh Circuit in Adler III and
Adler IV, I will skip over his dissent and address his reasoning in discussing those opinions.
82. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler 111), 206 F.3d 1070, 1073 (11 th Cir. 2000).
83. Id. at 1074.
84. Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)).
85. Adler I11, 206 F.3d at 1076.
86. See id. at 1087.
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student speaker."87 All of these factors, Judge Marcus concluded, made
Duval County's policy far different from the express sponsoring of relig-
ious expression in Lee. He compared the Board's policy, which he called
"content-neutral," to the line of cases permitting private religious speech
in public fora-a comparison that, as we have seen, the Supreme Court
subsequently rejected in Santa Fe.88 The graduation venue, he con-
cluded, was "equally available for religious or secular expression" by
the student speaker.89 He thus concluded that the policy was indistin-
guishable from the one upheld by the Ninth Circuit in Doe v. Madison
School District No. 321,90 in which that court gave its blessing to a pol-
icy allowing for speech on any subject by a minimum of four student
speakers selected on the basis of academic standing.9 The court also
found no coercion under Lee, because the message was "privately
crafted" and could not be laid at the feet of any state actor.92
The court reached the same conclusion under Lemon. Taking a def-
erential approach to the district's argument that its policy had a secular
purpose,93 it argued that three such interests were implicated by Duval
County's policy. First, the county wished to "afford[ ] graduating stu-
dents an opportunity to direct their own graduation ceremony by select-
ing a student speaker to express a message." 94 Second, the Graduation
Prayer Memo sought to "solemnize graduation as a seminal educational
experience." '95 Third, the policy "evince[d] an important and long
accepted secular interest in permitting student freedom of expression,
whether the content of the expression takes a secular or religious
form."9 6 It disdained the argument that the history of actions by the
school district, including titling its policy with the words "Graduation
Prayer," revealed the district's argued purposes to be a sham, concluding
that the evidence was insufficient and that the memorandum and its title
did no more than describe the issue without "compelling[ ] the outcome
of th[e] debate."97 It also found no primary effect of advancing religion,
arguing that the policy "allows a student message on any topic of the
87. Id. at 1076.
88. Id. at 1077.
89. Id. at 1078.
90. 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
91. See Adler 111, 206 F.3d at 1078-79, 1082 (comparing the Graduation Prayer Memo policy
to a policy allowing for the election of a homecoming queen or a student speaker at graduation).
92. Id. at 1083.
93. See id. at 1084.
94. Id. at 1085.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1087.
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student's choice" and that, in any event, any religious speech that
occurred was the sole result of the student's choice, not the school's.98
Nor did it find any excessive entanglement with religion. 99
Judge Kravitch, joined by Judge Barkett, dissented. She argued that
Duval County's policy's "only credible purpose is to maximize the
chance that prayer will continue to play a prominent role in Duval
County graduations," and that the primary effect of the policy was to
advance religion.100 For Judge Kravitch, the majority's attempt to
"focus[ ] on the student standing alone at the podium delivering an
uncensored message" while "ignor[ing] how she got there" was all too
simple.' 0 ' Rejecting the majority's effort to describe the policy, and the
student election process, as neutral and secular, she thought the policy
did "encourage the senior class to consider religious criteria in planning
the opening and closing."'0 2 This encouragement began with the format
of the speech itself, whose brevity and placement at the opening and
closing of the ceremony, which echoed the county's placement of gradu-
ation prayers prior to Lee, "provide clues about the type of message the
school administration had in mind."'0 3 Nor did she agree with the major-
ity's description of the student vote as taking place essentially without
regard to the anticipated content of the resulting speech. In her view, all
of the factors taken together suggested that the county, if subtly, was
"encourag[ing] the choice of prayer."'0" Citing Barnette, she did not find
the fact that the policy took place through a majoritarian vote comfort-
ing, and argued that by the majority's logic, "student councils could,
without prompting, vote to decorate each classroom with the Ten Com-
mandments or to have a student volunteer begin each day by reading a
prayer over the public address system."' 15
Under the Lemon test, the dissent argued that "[t]he context sur-
rounding the creation of the policy, the policy's terms, and the policy's
title all suggest its predominantly religious purpose." ' 6 Finding such a
purpose "requires no speculation," Judge Kravitch added, "but only
common sense."'0 7 Likewise, she argued that the "seeming neutrality"
of the policy could not disguise a "preference for religious expression"
98. Id. at 1089.
99. Id. at 1090.
100. Id. at 1091 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1092.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1096.
105. Id. at 1095.
106. Id. at 1098.
107. Id
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that led to a primary effect of advancing religion. 108 She drew on evi-
dence of actual school practice since the promulgation of the policy,
which suggested that many principals in the school district had held
direct votes on whether to have a graduation prayer, that others "directly
asked the senior class chaplain to deliver a message during graduation,"
and that still others listed the student speaker as "Chaplain" in the gradu-
ation program and referred to his or her speeches as "invocation[s]" or
"benediction[s]" rather than "messages."' °9
Finally, she rejected the majority's effort to liken the case to the
public forum line of cases, arguing that "Duval County's graduation cer-
emonies have none of the public forum's characteristics.""' In sum, she
concluded that Duval County had shown a clear intention of preserving
its tradition of graduation prayers despite Lee, and that its use of the
student vote mechanism to do so "corrupts the most cherished of democ-
racy's tools. For the government cannot delegate the authority to do
what it could not itself, and constitutional rights are not subject to the
whims of an electoral majority."''
Between this decision and the final act, the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Santa Fe intervened. Adler, in which a petition for a writ of
certiorari had been filed, was instead vacated and remanded by the
Supreme Court for further consideration in light of its decision in Santa
Fe."
l2
In an eight-to-four vote, the Eleventh Circuit let stand its earlier
ruling. Again writing for the en-banc court, Judge Marcus brusquely
rejected the view that Santa Fe changed anything at all:
Simply put, after (as before) Santa Fe, it is impossible to say that the
Duval County policy on its face violates the Establishment Clause
without effectively banning all religious speech at school gradua-
tions, no matter how private the message or how divorced the content
of the message may be from any state review, let alone censorship.
Santa Fe does not go that far, and we are not prepared to take such a
step.' 13
Emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause rulings, the majority focused on particular aspects of the
Court's ruling in Santa Fe that it said distinguished that case from the
Adler case. It focused first on the Court's finding in Santa Fe that the
108. Id. at 1101.
109. Id. at 1102.
110. Id. at 1103.
Ill. Id. at 1106.
112. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
113. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001).
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student speech was "state-sponsored rather than private." '14 It character-
ized the Court's ruling on this point as based on two facts: that the
speech in Santa Fe was subject to regulation by school officials, and that
the policy at issue in Santa Fe "by its terms[ ] invites and encourages
religious messages."' 1 5 It added: "Those two dispositive facts are not
present here, and that makes all the difference."' 
1 6
On the first point, the majority correctly noted that Duval County's
Graduation Prayer policy affirmatively forbade school officials to regu-
late the content of any student speech in an opening or closing mes-
sage. "' On the second, the court reprised its earlier conclusion that
Duval County's policy was "entirely neutral regarding whether a mes-
sage is to be given, and if a message is to be given, the content of that
message."" 8 Under the circumstances, it concluded, "the speech at issue
here-unlike the speech contemplated by the Santa Fe policy-cannot
reasonably be described as state sponsored."" 9
The court next took up the question of the majoritarian vote mecha-
nisms which were common to both cases, and which it described as "the
linchpin of the [Santa Fe] Court's analysis" of whether student religious
speech was public or private.'20 In its view, the Court's conclusion on
this issue turned on its finding that the Santa Fe policy, "by specifically
permitting students to vote upon an 'invocation' and authorizing school
officials to ensure that any message proposed by the chosen student was
'appropriate,' made it virtually impossible for the election to be anything
other than a referendum on conducting prayer." 121 The court character-
ized the policy in Adler as simply involving whether or not to deliver a
"message," which it described as "not expressly or inherently con-
cern[ing] prayer."' 122 Any prayer that resulted from such a policy, it sug-
gested, would be wholly incidental, and the record showing that only ten
of seventeen high schools that had acted on the policy featured religious
messages at graduation confirmed this.' 23 Any suggestion that the policy
bent the students' will toward prayer, it said, was "pessimistic about the
exercise of First-Amendment freedoms."'
' 24
The majority rejected any suggestion that the Court's opinion in
114. Id. at 1336.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1336-37.
118. Id. at 1337.




123. See id. at 1339.
124. Id. at 1339 n.2.
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Santa Fe had altered matters by delving deeply into the background of
the policy at issue in that case. It argued that the actual motivations of
the Duval County School Board remained opaque at best. 25 In any
event, it suggested that the conduct at issue in Santa Fe more clearly
indicated that school board's effort to inject prayer into the school con-
text than did Duval County's conduct.
26
The only basis for altering its earlier ruling, the court concluded,
would be if Santa Fe had dramatically altered the legal landscape, and it
held that it had not.127 It had not ruled "that an election process itself is
always incompatible with the Establishment Clause. Nor did it rule that
a student elected to speak to the student body is necessarily a state-
sponsored speaker." 28 Rather, it had reached a highly fact-specific deci-
sion that did not require the en-banc court to revise its earlier ruling in
Adler. In particular, "above all," what mattered in Santa Fe was "the
additional element of state control over the content of the message,"
1 29
which it found was absent here.
In sum, the court concluded, Santa Fe had not "declare[d] that all
religious expression permitted at a public school graduation ceremony
violates the Establishment Clause . . . We could not invalidate Duval
County's policy, on its face, without taking the very step the Court
declined to take."13 The "critical facts" that distinguished the case from
Santa Fe-"the complete absence in the text of code words such as
'invocation' unequivocally connoting religion, the policy's outright pro-
hibition on state content review of non-or-anti-religious messages, the
lack of any evidence ... that students must vote up-or-down on prayer,
and the sparseness of the record"-convinced it that there was no need
to revisit its earlier ruling.'
3'
Judge Kravitch dissented, this time joined by Chief Judge Anderson
and Judge Carnes, in addition to Judge Barkett. Against the majority's
repeated references to the facial nature of the challenge in Adler, she
argued that "the Court in Santa Fe flatly rejected the school district's
argument that a facial challenge to the validity of the District's policy is
premature until a student actually delivers a solemnizing message."'
132 If
the Graduation Prayer Memo betrayed an unconstitutional purpose, she
wrote, Santa Fe instructed that the policy was unconstitutional even if
125. See id. at 1340.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1340-41.
129. Id. at 1341.
130. Id. at 1342.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1343 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
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some graduation messages "might be totally devoid of religious con-
tent."' 33 Moreover, she asserted, the majority erred in supposing that,
because the election mechanism stripped the district of control over the
messenger or the content of the message, it was not responsible for the
results of the policy. Quoting Santa Fe, she argued that the
"majoritarian election [policy] might ensure that most of the students
are represented, [but] does nothing to protect the minority." Indeed,
the very mechanism that the majority of this Court claims removes
any impermissible coercion from the Duval policy serves to silence
students espousing minority views, and forces them to participate in a
state-sponsored exercise in which the message is determined by stu-
dents holding majority views. The First Amendment does not permit
such coercion.134
Judge Kravitch rejected the majority's efforts to draw distinctions
between the facts in Santa Fe and Adler. The majority made much of the
distinction between the Santa Fe policy's reference to a "statement or
invocation" and the Adler policy's reference to a "message." But in the
dissent's view, the distinction was immaterial, because the word "mes-
sage" ultimately meant the same thing once one took into account "the
policy's purpose, history, and the context in which it was adopted." '35
Similarly, the majority's emphasis on the fact that the Adler policy,
unlike the one in Santa Fe, maintained no control over the content of the
student speeches was faulty because the policy, viewed in a proper con-
text, still had an impermissible purpose and was designed to "ensure[ ]
that minority viewpoints will be silenced, and that those possessing such
viewpoints will be forced to participate in the majority's 'message.' 136
In Judge Kravitch's view, the majority rescued the policy from an
Establishment Clause violation only by stripping it of its context, ignor-
ing such matters as the very title of the Graduation Prayer Memo, in
violation of Santa Fe's requirement that the court examine "the context
in which the policy was enacted." '37 In her view, the context and content
of the Graduation Prayer Memo, with its reference to the District's past
practice of having graduation prayers and its efforts to find a new way to
allow such prayers, showed that "the policy's purpose is to endorse stu-
dent-initiated rather than school-initiated prayers at graduation, not
merely to allow students to deliver a generic message. "138
Judge Carnes, who had abandoned his earlier vote for the majority
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1344 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000)).
135. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1344 (11th Cir. 2001).
136. Id. at 1346.
137. Id. at 1344-45.
138. Id. at 1346.
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in Adler III and joined the dissent in Adler IV, filed a dissent of his own,
charging the majority with a grudging and perhaps disingenuous
approach to its obligation to reexamine its earlier decision in light of
Santa Fe. In his view, the majority read Santa Fe only in light of
whether it specifically commanded the court to revisit its ruling in Adler,
and not in terms of "what the Establishment Clause, read in light of
Santa Fe, permits."'
' 39
Judge Cames based his departure from his earlier vote on his con-
clusion that Santa Fe had "unequivocally held that [the] principle of
facial challenge law does not apply in the Establishment Clause area."' 4 °
With that in mind, he engaged in a more careful examination of the
context and background of the Graduation Prayer Memo policy and con-
cluded that it betrayed an impermissible purpose, beginning, again, with
the very title of the memorandum. Beyond this, he noted that the
requirement that the "message" come at the beginning or end of the
ceremony, and be no more than two minutes in length, made quite clear
that the Board was aiming at encouraging a "good, short prayer" at its
schools' graduations.'
More central still to Judge Carnes's reading of Santa Fe was his
conclusion that that decision taught that "a school board may not dele-
gate to the student body or some subgroup of it the power to do by
majority vote what the school board itself may not do."' 4 2 Although he
acknowledged that the policy in this case offered the appearance of stu-
dent autonomy in deciding whether to give a message and what kind of
message it should be, he concluded that "Santa Fe makes clear what
should have been apparent all along: the messenger is not autonomous
from the majority who chooses her any more than a political figure is
autonomous from the majority who selects him."' 4 3
Given his conclusion that the policy, taken as a whole and in light
of its history and context, was aimed at encouraging graduation prayers,
it was but a small step from this to his conclusion that the policy ulti-
mately put the school's resources behind any message that a majority of
students might want to hear, through a process that would give no heed
to minority views. In these circumstances, since the government
allow[ed] its power and authority to be wielded according to the will
of a majority of students, the resulting message delivered on govern-
ment property during a government-controlled event is the message
of government .... The identity of the messenger is controlled and
139. Id. at 1348 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1347.
141. Id. at 1350.




the content of the message is censored in advance through the major-
ity selection process.'"
Judge Carnes argued that Duval County did "not just permit[ ] but
invites" a religious majority to impose its views on the minority through
the majoritarian election process.'45 He concluded:
As interpreted in Santa Fe, the Establishment Clause forbids that type
of exercise of majority power. Government is not allowed to aid in
the establishment of religion by giving a majority of students a proxy
to use government power to do that which government itself may not
do. 1
4 6
III. WHAT ADLER GOT WRONG
Writing shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, and
before the Eleventh Circuit's post-Santa Fe opinion in Adler IV,14 7 Pro-
fessor Ira Lupu wrote that "[t]he sweeping opinion in Santa Fe should
resolve the uncertainty . . . about the acceptability of school-enacted
policies which are designed to promote student-spoken prayer at com-
mencement or other school-sponsored events."'' 48 He added:
After Santa Fe, any system of student election, in which school pol-
icy promotes invocation as a message or solemnization as a purpose,
is doomed. Moreover, any system of official selection of student
speakers for such events will violate the Establishment Clause if the
history and context of the selection system reveals an official desire
to have or maintain prayer at the event. Given the usual history of
such policies, enacted in the wake of Lee precisely to avoid that deci-
sion's strictures and thereby maintain a community custom of gradu-
ation prayer, few are likely to survive. Indeed, school districts' best
hope is that the U.S. Courts of Appeals will stubbornly resist the
teachings of Santa Fe.
1 4 9
In this Section, I will argue that Professor Lupu was all too pre-
scient. Despite its efforts, the en-banc majority in Adler fails to per-
suade. In treating the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe in fairly
narrow terms, the majority captures some of the lyrics of the Court's
decision in Santa Fe, but is deaf to the music of the opinion. In particu-
lar, the Adler decision's narrow focus on particular factors that played a
part in the Santa Fe Court's judgment neglects the Court's overarching
144. Id. at 1350.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references in the text to "Adler" are to the decision
in Adler v. Duval County School Board (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1344 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
148. Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms,
and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 771, 810 (2001).
149. Id.
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emphasis on the need for courts to confront "the realit[y] of the situa-
tion"'l5 -to "refuse to turn a blind eye to the context" in which school
prayer policies arise. 5' As the policy's very name suggests, that contex-
tual approach should have doomed the Graduation Prayer Memo policy
in Adler just as surely as it doomed the prayer policy in Santa Fe. Even
on the narrower and more technical reading of Santa Fe offered by the
Adler court, the decision is still wrong. As we will see, the conclusions I
reach in this Section point us toward the broader questions that the
remainder of this Article will address.
The Adler majority's failure to fully confront the import of Santa
Fe-what Professor Lupu aptly calls its resistance to Santa Fe152 -is
apparent at the very outset of its substantive discussion of the applica-
tion of the Supreme Court's decision. It notes that "[i]n Santa Fe itself
the Supreme Court reiterated just how case-specific Establishment
Clause analysis must be under its precedent."' 53 But it strikes this note
for essentially defensive purposes, using the fact-intensive nature of the
Supreme Court's inquiry in Santa Fe to argue that "[t]he facts of this
case are fundamentally different, and in our view require exactly the
same result today as they did at the time of our prior opinion."' 54 The
Adler majority wields Santa Fe's close examination of the facts as a
shield against revisiting its earlier ruling.
But this misses the point of the Supreme Court's approach. Santa
Fe makes clear that in cases involving school policies that might consti-
tute an endorsement of prayer, the reviewing court's duty is to carefully,
skeptically, and searchingly look at the factual context behind that pol-
icy. As the Court notes, the reviewing court's job is to look at "factors
beyond just the text of the policy."' 55 Courts must look beyond the text
to the "legislative history[ ] and implementation of the [policy],"' 56 in
order to "'distinguish a sham secular purpose from a sincere one
.... , ,1" This searching inquiry is required even in facial challenges, in
which the court "not only can, but must, include an examination of the
circumstances surrounding [the policy's] enactment."' 58 The Santa Fe
Court's focus on the circumstances surrounding the school prayer policy
150. Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000).
151. Id. at 315.
152. Lupu, supra note 148, at 810.
153. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001).
154. Id.
155. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307.
156. Id. at 308 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment)).
157. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in judgment)).
158. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315.
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at issue in that case was thus not an invitation to find bases for distin-
guishing that opinion; it was a command that lower courts engage in the
same kind of skeptical inquiry that the Court undertook in Santa Fe. It
was a reminder to other courts to "refuse to turn a blind eye to the con-
text" in which school prayer policies arise in school districts.
159
This is precisely what the Adler majority fails to do, as the dissent-
ers clearly recognized.160 Instead, it rests summarily on its "earlier find-
ings, '  refusing to reexamine them in light of Santa Fe's clear
direction to thoroughly, and skeptically, scour the record for evidence of
state promotion of school prayer. No other explanation adequately
accounts for the court's failure to consider a host of factors that sug-
gested that the Duval County policy was intended to continue its policy
of permitting and encouraging the kinds of prayers that had been out-
lawed by the Court in Lee v. Weisman.
Those factors are not buried in an inscrutable or "limited
record."' 62 To the contrary, they begin with the text of the policy itself,
which is styled, in capital letters, "GRADUATION PRAYERS."' 63 The
majority makes much of the fact that the policy refers only to "opening
and/or closing message[s],"'" but that language cannot be understood
outside the context of the memorandum announcing the policy, whose
first paragraph makes clear in two separate instances that these messages
refer to prayers.1 61 Similarly, as Judge Kravitch recognizes, the policy's
reference to "a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed two
minutes,"' 66 is no accident. Taken in the context of both the memoran-
dum and the history behind it, under which Duval County had appar-
ently conducted school prayer ceremonies of the kind banned by Lee v.
Weisman, 67 it is clear that these "message[s]" are consistent with the
159. Id.
160. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1344-45 (11 th Cir. 2001)
(Kravitch, J., dissenting) ("The majority, by extracting the core policy from the remaining text of
the memorandum promulgating the policy (the "Policy Memo"), ignores the mandate of the
Supreme Court that an evaluation of the purpose of a policy like Santa Fe's or Duval's is not
complete without an examination of the context in which the policy was enacted.") (footnote
omitted); id. at 1348, 1350 (Carnes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Adler IV majority's failure to
consider the Duval County graduation prayer policy in light of the lessons of Santa Fe).
161. Id. at 1340 n.3 (majority opinion).
162. Id. at 1340.
163. Id. at 1344 n. I (Kravitch, J., dissenting). As Judge Kravitch points out, this language goes
beyond the actual policy struck down in Santa Fe, which in its final iteration "did not contain the
word 'prayer."' Id. at 1345 n.2.
164. Id. at 1345 n.1.
165. See id. (referring to "prayers at graduation ceremonies" and "student initiated and led
prayers").
166. Id.
167. See id. (stating in the Graduation Prayer Memorandum that after Lee, "we would no
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timing and length of "a good, short prayer."' 168 These conclusions are
buttressed by the admittedly limited record of discussion of the policy
by the School Board, which points to the conclusion that "the board
adopted the policy in an effort to make prayer a part of graduation."'
' 69
As Judge Carnes writes, "the purpose of Duval County's 'Graduation
Prayers' policy is," quite evidently, "consistent with its name."' 7 °
In short, in purporting to follow Santa Fe, the Adler majority
misses the central lesson of that decision, which requires courts to care-
fully scrutinize the record of such cases for evidence showing that a
school board has promoted school prayer. The evidence in Adler more
than amply pointed to the conclusion that the Duval County School
Board did just that. Duval County's policy clearly followed the "usual
history of such policies, enacted in the wake of Lee precisely to avoid
that decision's strictures and thereby maintain a community custom of
graduation prayer."' 71 Only the Adler majority's refusal to read the
record in anything other than a forgiving light-only its willingness to
"turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose," and to fail
to "recognize what every [Duval County] student understands clearly-
that this policy is about prayer"-allows it to leave the policy
undisturbed.'72
Even on the narrow terms in which Adler reads Santa Fe, the out-
come is still mistaken. The Adler majority describes as "[c]ritical to the
Supreme Court's [opinion]" in Santa Fe the conclusion that the Santa Fe
policy represented government rather than private speech.' 73 Ignoring
the broadly critical contextual approach to the case that we have seen at
work in this Section, the majority argues that the Court in Santa Fe
relied primarily on two factors: "(1) the speech was subject to particular
regulations that confine the content and topic of the student's message;
and (2) the policy, by its terms, invites and encourages religious
messages."' 74 The court is wrong in both instances.
The first factor focused on by the court points out that in Santa Fe,
longer be able to have prayers at graduation ceremonies") (emphasis added); see also Smith,
supra note 54, at 312-13.
168. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1350 (Cames, J., dissenting). Indeed, according to one account,
when one of the members of the Adler family graduated from high school in 1998, "the school
principal introduced the 'senior message' by directing everyone to 'remain standing for the
invocation."' Robyn E. Blumer, Activist Court Embraces Religious Intolerance, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMeS, June 13, 1999, at 4D.
169. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1346 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1350 (Cames, J., dissenting).
171. Lupu, supra note 148, at 810.
172. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000).
173. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1336.
174. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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the student invocation was "subject to particular regulations that confine
the content and topic of the student's message."'7 5 This control of con-
tent stemmed from the policy's statement that the invocations were to
"solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student
safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the competi-
tion."' 7 6 According to the Adler majority, this stands "in sharp contrast"
to the Duval County policy, which affirmatively forbids the School
Board and its subordinates from monitoring or reviewing the messages
the students choose to deliver.' 77 To the court, this distinction severs the
link between public and private expression, such that "[n]o reasonable
person attending a graduation could view that wholly unregulated mes-
sage as one imposed by the state."' 78 Absent "the element of potential
censorship, and the attendant risk . . . that non-religious messages (or
messages hostile to religion) will be suppressed," the speech cannot be
considered state sponsored.
79
As I have already argued, this argument misses the forest for the
trees, because the Santa Fe Court's conclusions on this point were not
derived from a narrow reading of the school prayer policy, but from a
broad contextual examination of "the realities of the situation."' 8 ° A
focus on the bare text of Duval County's policy thus does not conclu-
sively demonstrate that the apparent hands-off nature of the policy ren-
ders it purely private speech. The Adler court fails to provide a proper
analysis of the question.
In any event, the court gets it wrong. First, as we have already seen,
the Graduation Prayer Memo makes clear that it is encouraging "mes-
sage[s]" on a particular subject-namely, "prayers at graduation cere-
monies. '  The content of the "message" is further constrained and
controlled by the state, and pushed in the direction of prayer, by requir-
ing that the message be no more than two minutes long and come at the
beginning or end of the graduation exercise.' 82 As Judge Carnes notes,
this suggests that the "message[s]" were to fill precisely the length,
175. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 303.
176. Id. at 298 n.6; see also id. at 306-07.
177. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1336-37.
178. Id. at 1337.
179. Id. at 1341.
180. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305; see also Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1346-47 (Kravitch, J,
dissenting) ("It was not solely the existence of two facts, however, but rather a contextual analysis
of the District's entire policy, including its history and purpose, that persuaded the Santa Fe Court
that the policy impermissibly coerced students to participate in a religious exercise chosen by the
majority of the graduating class.").
181. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1344-45 n.l (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (setting out the full text of the
Memo).
182. See id. at 1345 n.]; see also id. at 1350 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
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space, and role of the graduation prayers that existed in Duval County
until Lee v. Weisman.' 83 This is no accident: as Judge Carnes observes,
"no one sues about student participation [vel non] in graduation ceremo-
nies, but people do sue about whether prayer is allowed or prohibited at
graduation and other school-related events."' 84 These facts, suggesting
that Duval County meant to encourage students to deliver two-minute
religious invocations and benedictions at graduation, restore the link
between the District and the message that the majority argues has been
severed by the lack of content control. In these circumstances, a reasona-
ble observer could easily see the hand of the state in the resulting relig-
ious message. 85 If Duval County's policy purports to leave the content
of the graduation messages up to the students, it is not because the
School Board is indifferent to what they say; it is because, as in Santa
Fe, the District understood full well "what every ...student" would
have understood "clearly-that this policy [was] about prayer. "186
More importantly, the Adler court's conclusion that Duval
County's policy is content-neutral, and thus involves private speech,
effectively ignores the role of the majoritarian student selection process
in encouraging school prayer. In a school district with a long history of
school prayer and a substantial majority belonging to a single faith, it
was clearly understood that a majoritarian speaker selection process
would result in the increased "probability"-indeed, the likely certainty,
at least on many occasions-"that a prayer [would] be delivered at
graduation."' 87
Although most of the Adler majority's discussion of the purported
content-neutrality of the Graduation Prayer policy is simply untethered
from the majoritarian-vote question, it does recognize that "[t]he linch-
pin of the [Santa Fe] Court's analysis on this issue was its finding that
Santa Fe's policy subjected the issue of prayer to a majoritarian
vote."'188 But the majority argues that the Supreme Court's finding on
this issue depended on its conclusion that the Santa Fe policy, by speak-
ing in terms of an invocation and by ensuring that the student message
was appropriate, "made it virtually impossible for the election to be any-
183. See id. at 1350 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 1347 n.4 (Kravitch, J., dissenting) ("Because at graduation the majority-elected
student delivers her message at a preordained point in a program planned by school officials who
determine the place, time, attire, and all other aspects of the ceremony, members of the listening
audience must perceive the [student's] message as a public expression of the views of the majority
of the student body delivered with the approval of the school administration.") (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
186. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000).
187. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1346 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1338 (Marcus, J., majority opinion) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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thing other than a referendum on conducting prayer. Indispensable to
this analysis was the school district's unambiguous concession that the
vote authorized by the policy was indeed a vote up-or-down on
prayer." 189 By contrast, the majority argues, because students in Duval
County only voted on whether to permit a student "message" and who
would deliver it, "it cannot plausibly be argued that, on its face, the
Duval County policy calls for a student vote on whether to mandate the
inclusion of prayer in a graduation ceremony."' 90 In its view, this means
that whether students choose to have a prayer "is not preordained," and
reflects only "the uncensored and wholly unreviewable decision of a sin-
gle student speaker."'
' 91
Again, this both misunderstands and resists the reasoning in Santa
Fe. Central to the Court's conclusion in that case was the underlying
principle that "student elections that determine, by majority vote, which
expressive activities shall receive or not receive school benefits are con-
stitutionally problematic."'' 92 Such procedures, while ensuring that the
majority has its say, "do[ ] nothing to protect minority views but rather
place[ ] the students who hold such views at the mercy of the major-
ity." 93 That process "involv[es] the school in the selection of the
speaker," because whether to hold such elections in the first place is a
matter within the school district's discretion, and because the message is
then delivered to an audience gathered at the school's behest, assisted by
all the resources devoted to the ceremony by the school.'
Nor did the Santa Fe Court rely strictly on the terms of the policy
itself, or even on the School District's concession that the vote centrally
concerned prayer. Rather, its conclusion that the majoritarian device
failed to insulate the school from the product of the students' choice
relied on its examination of the "election mechanism ... in light of the
history in which the policy in question evolved."'' 95 Again, then, the
nature and effect of the policy could only be properly viewed once the
Court carefully examined the context in which the policy took place. It
was that inquiry that suggested that the Santa Fe policy improperly sub-
jected student views on religion to a majoritarian vote, a policy at odds
with the longstanding principle that "fundamental rights may not be sub-
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1339.
192. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304 (2000) (citing Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).
193. Santa Fe, 290 U.S. at 304.
194. Id. at 306; see also id. at 307-08.
195. Id. at 311.
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mitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."'' 96
This kind of contextual analysis is almost entirely absent from the
majority's decision in Adler, which focuses largely on the text of the
policy itself and suggests that the policy must be read in light of the
facial nature of the attack on the policy. A more sensitive analysis would
have compelled the contrary conclusion. Viewed in context, as we have
seen, Duval County's Graduation Prayer policy clearly aimed at provid-
ing a space in the graduation ceremony for a specifically religious "mes-
sage," one whose timing and length precisely suggested an opening
invocation and a closing benediction.
The majority argues that it cannot be said that "the Duval County
policy calls for a student vote on whether to mandate the inclusion of
prayer in a graduation ceremony."' 97 But this is asking the wrong ques-
tion. The key question is whether the School District deployed a
majoritarian election process that encouraged student prayer, a process
that used the power of numbers to give voice to majority religious views
without leaving the minority any effective out. 198 This the policy handily
accomplished. As Judge Kravitch writes, given the impermissible pur-
pose of the policy, the majoritarian device hardly rescues the School
District; to the contrary, it "ensures that minority viewpoints will be
silenced, and that those possessing such viewpoints will be forced to
participate in the majority's 'message.' '199
Finally, the majority wrongly asserts that the policy cannot be
flawed if it is anything less than "impossible for the election to be any-
thing other than a referendum on conducting prayer."2 ° To the contrary,
it says, the fact that religious messages occurred in only ten of the seven-
teen cases reflected in the record proves that minority views are pro-
tected; this contradicts Santa Fe's statement that "the majoritarian
process implemented by the district guarantees, by definition, that
minority candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effec-
tively silenced."' '
This is an obtuse reading of both the facts of Adler and the Court's
pronouncement in Santa Fe. For one thing, it neglects the record itself,
which offered a very different picture of how the schools behaved under
196. Id. at 304-05 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
197. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1338 (1lth Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
198. See id. at 1349 (Carnes, J., dissenting) ("All the majority has to do to ensure that a
religious message is delivered at graduation is select as its messenger one whom it can rely upon
to give such a message. There is no reason at all to believe that will be difficult to do.").
199. Id. at 1346 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1338.
201. Id. (quoting Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304).
[Vol. 63:835
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DISTRUST
the policy. As Judge Kravitch noted in the Court's earlier en-banc opin-
ion, the evidence suggested that many schools had indeed voted directly
on whether to have a graduation prayer; others "directly asked the senior
class chaplain to deliver a message during graduation," while other
schools listed the student speaker as "Chaplain" in the graduation pro-
gram and referred to his or her speeches as "invocation[s]" or "benedic-
tion[s]" rather than "messages. '202 Even if these facts are less directly
relevant in a facial challenge to the Graduation Prayers policy, they are
wholly relevant to the kind of contextual analysis that Santa Fe
demanded with respect to the impermissible purpose and effect of such
policies, even at the facial challenge stage.
Moreover, this is a strained reading of Santa Fe itself. Of course,
the policy in that case did not make it impossible for students to reject a
religious message; they could simply have voted not to have prayers at
football games. The Court's point was that, once the students voted to
have prayers, that choice would remain in place "for the entire sea-
son," 20 3 and there would be nothing the minority could do about it. That
is precisely the case in Adler. By subjecting the decision whether to have
students deliver "messages" to a majoritarian voting process, the school
district ensured that those schools that chose to have such a message
would lock such a message in place, leaving the minority no recourse
but to take its lumps. A student with minority religious views could not
move to another school when it came time for the graduation ceremony;
she would be stuck with having to listen to the religious views of the
popular majority at her own school. (Conversely, of course, a religious
student at a school that voted against having graduation "messages"
would be equally powerless to affect the outcome.)
Given the history and context of the Graduation Prayer policy, and
the demographics of each school, it is fair to say that "the policy seems
to have worked as intended for the most part."'" Perhaps the schools
that opted not to have a message, or in which a secular message was
delivered, were more religiously diverse than the schools that opted for a
religious message. But for schools in the latter category, the majoritarian
process enabled, or even encouraged, the religious majority to vote its
preferences into power, and left minority students with no recourse. In
that sense, Santa Fe was wholly on point: The process would guarantee
the airing of majority religious views and silence minority views, and it
would do so year after year. Judge Carnes observed that although relig-
202. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler 111), 206 F.3d 1070, 1102 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(Kravitch, J., dissenting).
203. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 303.
204. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1349 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
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ious messages were only delivered at some sixty percent of the schools
reflected in the record, "[s]ixty percent is ... close enough for govern-
ment work. '20 5 Perhaps more to the point, Duval County's policy
ensured that the encouragement of religious messages would be 100%
effective some sixty percent of the time, with no recourse for minority
views. 2°6 In short, the Adler majority wholly misses the point of Santa
Fe and fails either to understand or to properly apply its conclusion that
majoritarian processes that encourage or determine the delivery of relig-
ious student views, without protecting minority views, are "constitution-
ally problematic. 20 7
The final piece of the Adler majority's effort to distinguish Santa
Fe is its characterization of that case as having been based on the fact
that the Santa Fe policy, "by its terms, invites and encourages religious
messages. ' 2 8 The court concedes that "the Supreme Court did not limit
its analysis to the text of the Santa Fe policy," but argues that "it placed
heavy emphasis on the text's express and unambiguous preference for
the delivery of religious messages. '"2°9 It finds such a preference in the
Santa Fe policy's use of the term "invocation" and its references to sol-
emnizing the school event. 210 By contrast, it says, "the [Duval County]
policy is entirely neutral regarding whether a message is to be given, and
if a message is to be given, the content of that message.211
Short work can be made of this argument. First, the Duval County
policy is no more or less neutral, on its face, than the Santa Fe policy as
to whether a message is to be given. In both cases, the question is sub-
jected to an up-or-down student vote, and in both cases the result will be
absolutely enforced against the loser of that vote, and all the resources of
the school district brought to bear in airing the winner's message. For
the reasons we have seen, that is constitutionally unacceptable. Second,
as we have also seen, the majority's attempt to describe Santa Fe as
having leaned heavily on the express terms of the policy at issue in that
case utterly neglects the Santa Fe Court's real approach, which is deeply
reliant on the history and context of the policy. To say that Duval
County's policy on its face is neutral as to whether a religious message
is delivered, without considering the context in which the policy was
205. Id.
206. This calls to mind a line in the cinematic classic ANCHORMAN: THE LEGEND OF RON
BURGUNDY (DreamWorks 2004), in which Brian Fantana says of "Sex Panther" perfume:
"They've done studies, you know. Sixty percent of the time it works, every time."
207. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304.
208. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1336.
209. Id. at 1337.
210. Id. at 1337-38.
211. Id. at 1337.
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promulgated, the reasons behind it, and its apparent effort to continue a
preexisting policy of having graduation prayers, is to do precisely what
the Court warned against in Santa Fe: It "turn[s] a blind eye to the con-
text in which this policy arose," and refuses to recognize what the stu-
dents of Duval County surely "under[stood] clearly-that this policy
[was] about prayer. '2 1 2 As Judge Carnes rightly observes, Duval
County's policy did "not just permit[ ] but invit[ed]" the imposition of
prayer "by the majority regardless of the views of the minority.
'
"213
In sum, despite its efforts to escape the lessons of Santa Fe, Adler
gets it quite wrong. With all due respect, that a policy actually entitled
"Graduation Prayers" could have been understood as utterly neutral as to
religion beggars belief. That is especially true given the broader context
in which the policy arose, a context which the Eleventh Circuit was
duty-bound by Santa Fe to consider, and the fundamental First Amend-
ment principle that "fundamental rights.., depend on the outcome of no
elections,' '2 4 a principle that was announced by the Court more than a
half-century before Santa Fe. If, as Professor Lupu states, "Santa Fe
effectively outlawed any official prodding in the direction of student-led
prayer at school functions, 21 5 then Adler should have been an easy case.
It was; the majority is clearly wrong.
IV. SCHOOL PRAYER, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND DISTRUST
A. Ely, Representation-Reinforcement, and Religion
For a former law clerk, there is, I suppose, some Oedipal joy to be
had in pointing out when one's former master has erred. And for a law
and religion scholar, there is the additional value of helping to bring
order to a messy area and correct those courts that have "stubbornly
resist[ed]" the clear teachings of the Supreme Court in this field"' 6-
particularly when, as in this case, I think the Court got it right. But there
is more to the Eleventh Circuit's error in Adler than that. Ultimately,
both Santa Fe and Adler speak to broader questions of constitutional law
and theory, particularly in the area of the Religion Clauses. Those ques-
tions have not yet been fully or satisfactorily aired, and the purpose of
the remainder of this Article is to fill that gap.
In examining the questions I raise below, I draw substantially on
the work of the late John Hart Ely, whose Democracy and Distrust is
widely acknowledged, even by its critics, as one of the most important
212. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315.
213. Adler IV, 250 F.3d at 1350 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
214. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
215. Lupu, supra note 148, at 772.
216. Id. at 810.
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works of constitutional theory in the past three decades. Ely's work on
this subject is well-known, but a brief introduction may help set the
stage.
Democracy and Distrust is both an effort to explain and defend the
work of the Warren Court,217 and a broader attempt to rescue judicial
review from the counter-majoritarian difficulty described by Alexander
Bickel,21 8 which plagued constitutional theorists for most of the last half
of the Twentieth Century and continues, in a perhaps more exhausted
way, to animate much of contemporary constitutional theory. 219 The
book consists of two parts. In the first, Ely argues that neither "interpre-
tivist" nor "noninterpretivist" theories adequately justify or constrain
constitutional adjudication.22° In the second half of the book, which will
be my focus here, Ely sets out an alternate account of judicial review,
one that is centered on the (slightly more) modest role of the Supreme
Court as the defender of a properly functioning political process. Draw-
ing on the famous Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.,22 Ely argues that the central role of the Court is twofold. First, it
functions to "keep the machinery of democratic government running as
it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and com-
munication are kept open. 222 Second, and in service of the political pro-
cess function, the Court also "concern[s] itself with what majorities do
to minorities, particularly ... laws 'directed at' religious, national, and
racial minorities and those infected by prejudice against them. "223
Thus, both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, for Ely, should
be understood as being "principally, indeed I would say overwhelm-
ingly, dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to the iden-
tification and preservation of specific substantive values. '224 Ely finds
support for this reading across a wide swath of constitutional
provisions. 2 5
Ely finds two central principles at work, both of them captured by
the phrase "representation-reinforcement": "access to the tools of self-
217. The book is famously dedicated to Earl Warren, with the words, "You don't need many
heroes if you choose carefully." ELY, supra note 6, at v.
218. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986)
(1962).
219. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996).
220. See ELY, supra note 6, at 1-72.
221. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
222. ELY, supra note 6, at 76.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 92.
225. See id. at 88-101.
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government, and the elimination of prejudice.22 6 Under the access
prong of his approach, courts ensure that everyone has an equal opportu-
nity to participate, in a fair manner, "in the political processes by which
values are appropriately identified and accommodated. ' 227 The First
Amendment, for instance, ensures that people can have their voice heard
in the political process, while voting rights ensure equal representation
and participation in the legislative forum. The prejudice prong of Ely's
theory shores up his political process-oriented theory by ensuring that
discrete and insular minorities, who are likely to be perennial losers in
the political process, are not permanently disadvantaged by the
majority.228
Ely's theory is sufficiently familiar to constitutional lawyers that I
need not extend my summary description. It has also, of course, been
subjected to sustained criticism. 229 Much of that criticism has concerned
the question of whether Ely's theory of prejudice is genuinely process-
oriented rather than substantive, and thus whether his theory truly dis-
solves the counter-majoritarian difficulty. For two reasons, which are in
some tension, little turns on that question for purposes of this Article.
First, as Michael Klarman observes, even if the criticisms of Ely for
being more substantive than he is willing to acknowledge are valid, they
do not wholly dispel the value of Ely's theory; the access prong of Ely's
process-oriented theory "has emerged relatively unscathed from the
barbs of Ely's critics. '230 Even those critics who believe Ely cannot
make his case that a process-oriented theory of judicial review is imma-
nent in the Constitution still find his argument "ingenious, elegant, and
plausible."1231 Indeed, there is no doubt that Ely's representation-rein-
forcing theory of judicial review has much to recommend it, has a great
deal of potential explanatory force, and has been highly influential.
Second, as Frank Michelman has argued in an excellent recent arti-
226. Carlton Morse, Note, A Political Process Theory of Judicial Review Under the Religion
Clauses, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 793, 803 (2007).
227. ELY, supra note 6, at 77.
228. See id. at 135-79.
229. For prominent early examples, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on
the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J.
1037 (1980).
230. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.
747, 748 (1991).
231. Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Distrust Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 641, 646 (1991);
see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1282 (2005) ("After reading the book,
you want to believe that the theory was inherent in the Constitution.").
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cle, these criticisms of Ely may be somewhat misplaced. 32 On this
view, "strictly speaking Ely need not be understood" as having intended
to "purge constitutional discourse of controversial claims about val-
ues."2 33 To the contrary, Ely can be understood as having been
"unabashed about the substantive commitments embedded in his norma-
tive model of representative democracy," and as having required only
that courts "conscientiously strain to limit [their] entanglements to cases
in which upholding [those] commitment[s] required them. '234 As I
attempt to show in the remainder of this Article, in my view, even a
strongly process-oriented view of Ely's work still has much to say about
the proper interpretation of the Religion Clauses. To the extent that Ely
is properly viewed as having championed particular substantive views,
however, without necessarily signing on to Ely's substantive views in
toto, I am quite willing to accept the value of those substantive views to
the extent that they influence the argument I develop below.
I proceed, then, from the assumption that Ely has much to contrib-
ute to constitutional law and theory. I assume, moreover, that Ely has
much in particular to tell us about the proper functioning of the Religion
Clauses. And yet, Ely himself was hesitant to lump in the Religion
Clauses with the rest of his process-oriented understanding of the Con-
stitution. Although he suggested that "part of the point of combining
[the] cross-cutting commands" of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses "was to make sure the church and the government gave each
other breathing space," thus "perform[ing] a structural or separation of
powers function" that could be understood in light of process theory, he
did not think that was the whole story.2 35 He added immediately that
"the obvious cannot be blinked: part of the explanation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause has to be that for the framers religion was an important sub-
stantive value they wanted to put significantly beyond the reach of at
least the federal legislature." '236
Perhaps partly for that path-dependent reason, and perhaps for inde-
pendent substantive reasons, law and religion scholars have done little
232. Frank I. Michelman, The Not So Puzzling Persistence of the Futile Search: Tribe on
Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA L. REV. 891 (2007).
233. Id. at 896, 900.
234. Id. at 901.
235. ELY, supra note 6, at 94. For a similar take on the Religion Clauses, rooted in the
Kuyperian concept of sphere sovereignty, see Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment
Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (2009).
236. ELY, supra note 6, at 94; see also Tribe, supra note 228, at 1065 ("One difficulty that
immediately confronts process theorists is the stubbornly substantive character of so many of the
Constitution's most crucial commitments: commitments defining the values that we as a society,
acting politically, must respect. Plainly, the First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty and
its prohibition of religious establishment are substantive in this sense.").
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with Ely's representation-reinforcement theory. A few scholars have dis-
cussed the connections between the two, but have done so both cursorily
and skeptically.237 One valuable student work has usefully elaborated on
the relationship between Ely's theory and the Religion Clauses, although
I do not agree with all of that writer's conclusions.238 For the most part,
then, the relationship between representation-reinforcement theory and
the Religion Clauses remains a largely untapped well.
As I hope to show, Ely can in fact contribute significantly to our
understanding of the Religion Clauses. In particular, he can help shed
light on two central aspects of both Santa Fe and Adler, neither of which
has been adequately explored on its own terms. As we will see, Democ-
racy and Distrust can help us to think more clearly about the role of
distrust of democracy in Adler and Santa Fe; that is, about why
majoritarian processes like the one that was employed in Santa Fe not
only do not successfully insulate school districts from the Establishment
Clause consequences of student-led school prayer, but positively point in
the direction of an Establishment Clause violation. By the same token, it
can help us to see more plainly why the Eleventh Circuit was wrong in
Adler. Second, Democracy and Distrust can help us think more clearly
about demographics and distrust in law and religion. It can help us dis-
solve the general but unhelpful picture of religious pluralism that is said
to characterize the United States at the national level, and enable us to
think more clearly about the representation-reinforcing role of the Estab-
lishment Clause at the local level.
B. "Democracy" and Distrust: Majoritarian School Prayer
Schools, school districts, and state legislatures have sought to use
the vehicle of majoritarian student votes to find a place for prayers in
public-school ceremonies ever since the Supreme Court's decision in
Lee v. Weisman, often at the behest of various groups that argued that
these policies offered a way around the strictures of that opinion.2 39 Ever
237. See Morse, supra note 226, at 798 n.1 8 (collecting sources).
238. See id. passim. Morse's work focuses more on the role of mediating institutions within the
law-and-religion framework. That is an important matter, which I take up at length (without
reference to Ely) in Horwitz, supra note 235. But my concerns here are different. Another student
work specifically addresses Ely in the context of student-led prayer cases like Santa Fe and Adler.
See John P. Cronan, Note, A Political Process Argument for the Constitutionality of Student-Led,
Student-Initiated Prayer, 18 YALE L. & POL'y Rv. 503 (2000). It does not, however, develop the
connection at any length, and as the following discussion will suggest, I am unpersuaded by that
author's conclusions.
239. See Smith, supra note 54, at 305-14. As Smith notes, the more immediate impetus for the
majoritarian process movement was the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Jones v. Clear Creek
Independent School District, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), which suggested that some courts
might distinguish student-initiated prayers from school-endorsed prayers.
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since, a substantial number of courts-although, as Adler itself suggests,
not all of them-have raised the same objection to these policies: that, in
the words of the Supreme Court, a majority cannot "use the machinery
of the State to practice its beliefs."24 As one such court put it, "[t]he
notion that a person's constitutional rights may be subject to a majority
vote" is "anathema." 24 ' This is the position the Court reaffirmed in
Santa Fe, when it quoted Barnette for the proposition that "fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." '242 The battle lines have thus been drawn for some fifteen
years, and they were apparent in the Eleventh Circuit's debate over the
Duval County policy.
One way to view this debate is through the lens of whether student
prayers that result from a majoritarian process are genuinely attributable
to the private choices of students, or whether they are still school spon-
sored.243 The Supreme Court has emphasized the "crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect. ' 244 If student prayers selected
by a majority of schools can be treated as private and voluntary speech,
the argument runs, then they should fall on the permissible side of the
line.245
Although this may clarify the issues underlying the debate over
majoritarian student speech selection processes, it does not resolve them.
The difficult question with respect to such processes is whether they
render the student speech voluntary, or whether they engage the machin-
ery of the State in a way that violates the Constitution. To understand
this debate more clearly, it helps to understand just why it is that
majoritarian processes can violate the Constitution. This is where Ely's
representation-reinforcement theory makes its contribution.
240. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
241. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (E.D. Va. 1993); see also
ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'I Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1478 (3d Cir. 1996); Harris
v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1994).
242. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304-05 (2000) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
243. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent School
District, 90 Ky. L.J. 1, 4 (2002) (arguing that "the central consideration in analyzing school prayer
cases" is "the distinction between voluntary student prayer on the one hand, and state-sponsored
prayer on the other").
244. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
245. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("If the
State had chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of
those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to deliver a religious message, it would
have been harder to attribute an endorsement of religion to the State."). I discuss the import of this
passage in greater detail below.
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Ely's approach generally privileges the results of the political pro-
cess, arguing that courts should only intervene in the political process
when "the political market[ ] is systematically malfunctioning. ' 246 He
describes a malfunctioning political process in these terms:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one
is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority
out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonal-
ities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection
afforded other groups by a representative system.
247
Ely adds that legislative motivation may provide some evidence of
a malfunctioning political process. Ostensibly fair and democratic
processes that are transparently designed to entrench a particular out-
come desired by the majority and to keep out the minority-especially a
minority that for systematic reasons will continue to be subjected to hos-
tility at the hands of the majority-will counsel in favor of court inter-
vention. This is true even in cases in which the State need not grant
particular rights to anyone-where, for example, schools need not allow
any student to speak at a graduation ceremony but opt to allow some to
speak. In such cases, if
it can be proven that the officials are granting applications so as sys-
tematically to favor or disfavor a certain viewpoint or family of view-
points or indeed that they have instituted a given method of selection
with the expectation that it will have that effect, a constitutional viola-
tion will have been made out.2 48
On this process-oriented view, simple majoritarianism is not always
enough to ensure political outcomes that are both politically legitimate
and consistent with the Constitution. Of course, the political process
routinely generates winners and losers; that is how democracy functions.
But the political process is perverted when a seemingly fair process is
used in a way that systematically creates losers and entrenches them in
that status-and is designed to accomplish just this end. This is espe-
cially true when the political process systematically operates in a way
that deprives a minority of fundamental rights, 49 or in which the very
tools that are supposed to guarantee and maintain access to the political
246. ELY, supra note 6, at 103.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
249. See generally Douglas Laycock, Voting with Your Feet Is No Substitute for Constitutional
Rights, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29 (2009).
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system, such as free speech or, indeed, the free exercise of religion,25 °
are used in a way that deprives people of the ability to exercise those
rights.
To be clear, the problem is not one of losing per se-it is one of
losing in a repeated and systematic way, always along the same essential
lines and for the same immutable reasons. Nor is the problem one of
being forced to hear views that one finds disagreeable. As I will suggest
below, it is perfectly acceptable for someone to be exposed to even the
disagreeable views of others-whether political or religious views. But
it is unacceptable for the State to take advantage of the political process
in a way that inevitably and permanently rigs the game to the majority's
advantage. That is Ely's lesson.
Nor is it a sufficient response to this argument to say that, under
some set of circumstances, the losers could win.2 ' There are at least two
problems with this response. First, it turns a blind eye to the fact that, at
least in the kinds of circumstances that Ely would consider unconstitu-
tional, the process has been designed precisely to make sure that this
doesn't happen; it has been set up to deliver a particular and recurring
outcome that locks out the minority. If this does not occur in every sin-
gle place, it is still an impermissible form of "government work.
252
Second, it refuses to acknowledge the one-shot nature of rigged
systems when considered from the perspective of the loser, and the fair-
ness concerns raised by such systems. At least in situations involving the
distribution of a limited good, such as a speaking slot for a particular
250. Free exercise rights are often viewed not as political rights, but as non-political individual
rights tied to private beliefs and practices. For reasons I have offered elsewhere, that distinction is
false. Religious viewpoints can be as politically salient and powerful as any other reasons offered
for political action. Thus, protecting the free exercise of religion is ultimately not just a means of
protecting private belief and practice, but also a means of guaranteeing that individuals and groups
can form and voice religious arguments for political change. See generally Paul Horwitz, Religion
and American Politics: Three Views of the Cathedral (forthcoming 2009); Paul Horwitz, Religious
Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law and Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial
Nominations, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 75 (2006); see also Kathleen A. Brady, Religious
Group Autonomy: Further Reflections About What Is at Stake, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 153 (2006)
(arguing for religious group autonomy because, among other things, it enables religious believers
and groups to make political arguments); Morse, supra note 226 (arguing that Ely's political
process theory justifies a robust vision of religious freedom because religious groups serve a
powerful political function as mediating institutions in the civil sphere).
251. See, e.g., Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV) 250 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir.
2001) (observing that "in seven of the seventeen instances reflected in the record, students voted
for no message at all or for a student speaker who subsequently delivered an entirely secular
message"); id. at 1339 n.2 (criticizing Judge Carnes's dissent for assuming "that the student
speaker is nothing more than a puppet to give voice to the student body majority's demands for
prayer" and calling that assumption "deeply flawed").
252. Id. at 1349 (Carnes, J., dissenting) (noting that the Duval County policy "seems to have
worked as intended for the most part," and that if it did not always secure student prayer, the
policy was still "close enough for government work").
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occasion, there is only one opportunity to participate. A student only
attends one graduation ceremony. And, as the Santa Fe Court notes,
these are not public fora, in which both winners and losers can speak in
turn.25 3 Having lost the election, the member of the losing minority has
no recourse but to like it or lump it.254 She cannot simply raise her own
voice. Where the system has been designed to take systematic advantage
of the majority status of a particular belief system, this means that the
outcome for the minority is close to a foregone conclusion, and that
there is no recourse for the minority. That the minority loses, that its
own views are subordinated to the views of the majority, is problematic
enough, particularly where fundamental rights are concerned. That the
system is designed to achieve precisely this result adds insult to injury.
This is the problem with the graduation prayer policy established
by Duval County in Adler. The school district officials, who had been
besieged by objections to the loss of graduation prayer, knew their dis-
trict well enough to understand that a majoritarian process for selecting
graduation "messages" would inevitably, although perhaps not invaria-
bly, generate a result that would place the "ins" back in the driver's seat
and exclude the "outs." Given the nature of the graduation ceremony, in
which the school literally set the stage and in which dissenting voices
had no equal opportunity to speak, the process "guarantee[d], by defini-
tion, that minority candidates [would] never prevail and that their views
[would] be effectively silenced." '255 By definition, the majority might be
satisfied with such an outcome, but the minority never would be, and,
precisely because it was a minority, would lack any effective recourse.
The majoritarian process employed by Duval County thus "might
ensure that most of the students [were] represented," but "it [did] noth-
ing to protect the minority; indeed, it likely serve[d] to intensify their
offense." '256 The majoritarian process loaded the dice in favor of the
religious majority, and ensured that the minority would have no remedy
once the dice were cast.257 In sum, Ely's political process theory helps
us understand precisely why the majoritarian processes used in both
Santa Fe and Adler were so objectionable despite the patina of political
253. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302-04 (2000); see, e.g., id. at 303
("[Tihe school allows only one student, the same student for the entire season, to give the
invocation.").
254. See, e.g., ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d 1471, 1487 (1996) ("Although it is
true that [the policy] does not require the view that prevails in any given year to prevail in
subsequent years, it is nonetheless true that the effect of the particular prayer that is offered in any
given year will be to advance religion and coerce dissenting students.")
255. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 304.
256. Id. at 305; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992).
257. See RAVrrCH, supra note 10, at 66.
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legitimacy that the school districts in both cases tried to apply to the
process.
We can usefully contrast the Court's correct decision in Santa Fe,
and the Eleventh Circuit's incorrect decision in Adler, with two other
cases, one of which was rightly decided and the other wrongly decided.
These cases suggest that there is a difference between fair processes and
unfair ones, and that a fair process will by no means rule out student
religious speech at graduation ceremonies.
First, consider Doe v. Madison School District No. 321.258 In that
case, the Madison School District had a policy inviting "a minimum of
four students . . . to speak at commencement exercises according to
academic class standing.2 59 The content of the speech was left to the
individual and, as in Adler, was protected from censorship by the school
administration. 260 The plaintiff complained that because the policy
would "allow[ ] students to inject prayers and religious songs into the
graduation program," it violated the Establishment Clause. 261 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument. Like the Eleventh Circuit in Adler, the
Ninth Circuit relied in part on the absence of school control over the
content of the speakers' messages.262 But the court also noted the pres-
ence of another factor that distinguishes this case from Adler: the student
speakers were "selected by academic performance, a purely neutral and
secular criterion. 263
This distinction makes all the difference. There is a considerable
difference between a policy like that in Adler, which subjects the choice
of student speaker to a process that the school district understands will
almost certainly lead to the selection of a religious speaker and intends
this result to occur, and a policy in which the selection criteria are genu-
inely neutral. Under the latter policy, whether or not the process results
in a religious speech has nothing to do with local sentiments about relig-
ion. A student with a minority religious view is every bit as eligible for
selection, if she achieves the best grades in the class. Although, given
the simple demographics of a particular district, it may be that religious
students will more often than not be among the best students in the class,
their selection will turn only on their grades, and not on local views
about the merits of particular religious or non-religious beliefs. A minor-
ity student should thus be more willing to accept victory or defeat in this
selection process, knowing that it is no mere popularity contest and that
258. 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998).
259. Id. at 834 (emphasis added).
260. See id.
261. Id.




every student is given an equal and genuine opportunity to speak. If she
considered such a process from behind the proverbial Rawlsian veil of
ignorance, she would have no reason to complain that the process was
fundamentally tilted toward particular religious views.26
Madison is thus rightly decided, and reveals that it is possible to
craft student speaker selection policies that result in religious speech
without violating the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court recog-
nized this in Santa Fe. It noted that its decision would be quite different
if the case had involved a religious speaker who emerged from a process
that was indifferent to the religious nature of the message that would be
delivered, such as the selection of a student body president or a prom
king or queen. In such cases, that person's election might turn on general
popularity, but would not depend solely on the popularity of a religious
message to be delivered on a single occasion such as graduation.265
Because such positions still involve an element of popularity, they may
be closer calls than the policy at issue in Madison, which did not depend
on any such considerations. Assuming that a student body president or
prom king or queen might fulfill other functions or have other symbolic
meaning to the students, however, such a policy would at least be less
closely tied to the single question of using majoritarian processes to
guarantee a religious message at graduation.266
Ely himself speaks to the distinction between Madison and Santa
Fe and Adler. He offers a hypothetical in which a National Guard ser-
geant has to select three members of a six-man squad for a dangerous
264. In employing Rawls's veil-of-ignorance approach here, I should not be taken to be
making too strong a claim. I am making only the relatively narrow claim that such an approach
says something useful about why a student might consider a speaker selection process based on
criteria such as class performance fairer than one based on a majoritarian vote; I am not
suggesting that this approach is always necessary, or that it is possible in every circumstance to
divorce our views about fairness from our prior commitments. Cf Michelman, supra note 232, at
892 (distinguishing between "democratic process-based constitutional theories" such as Ely's, and
"liberal proceduralist constitutional theories" such as Rawls's). I am grateful to Marc DeGirolami
for pressing me on this point.
265. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304-05 n.15 (2000).
266. Critics of Ely might fairly point out that one would still at this point require a theory that
distinguishes the example of the prom king or queen, which turns on general popularity, from the
example of a majoritarian selection process that turns on the religious makeup of a graduating
class. If Ely is treated as having intended to purge his theory of controversial substantive
positions, then we would need to know why it is not an equally unacceptable result if, as seems
likely to be the case, only the "cool" students are elected as prom king or queen every year. But
see Michelman, supra note 232 (arguing that Ely did not intend to purge his theory of substantive
commitments). In any event, as I have argued above, I am comfortable with the thicker and more
substantive commitments that are implicit in this Article, and that I believe the Santa Fe Court
correctly identified as being present in the Constitution itself, which treats religion as having a
different status in the political process, at least in some cases, than questions of general
"coolness." I am grateful to Rick Schragger for his comments on this point.
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mission. He argues that the Constitution would not be offended "if those
three were picked because they had scored highest on their riflery tests,"
or even if they were chosen at random.2 67 It would be different, how-
ever, if the soldiers were selected based on their membership in a partic-
ular political party or ethnic group, or because they were the least
popular members of the squad. In such a case, the system would have
"malfunctioned. '2 68 As Ely notes, "[p]erhaps a properly functioning sys-
tem would have generated the same result. '269 But the problem is not the
result itself; it is the fact that the selection takes place in a way that rigs
the results in a palpably unfair way. This is the distinction between
Madison and Adler. Adler relied on a selection process that privileged
the locally popular religion for inclusion in the graduation ceremony and
excluded unpopular views; Madison presents a selection process in
which anyone may be chosen to speak for perfectly acceptable and neu-
tral reasons.
Consider also another Ninth Circuit case, Cole v. Oroville Union
High School District.27° That case involved a couple of different selec-
tion processes for student speakers at graduation. It involved both "a
spiritual invocation delivered by a student chosen by a vote of his or her
classmates" and "graduation speeches by the valedictorian and salutato-
rian.'"271 The school in recent years had reviewed speeches to make sure
"they were not offensive or denominational." '272 One student, Cole, was
chosen by his fellow students to deliver an invocation; the other,
Niemeyer, was co-valedictorian of his class.273 Both students submitted
openly sectarian speeches, both speeches were rejected, and both stu-
dents filed suit.
2 74
The Ninth Circuit found that the district officials were entitled to
qualified immunity, holding that "the District's refusal to allow the stu-
dents to deliver a sectarian speech or prayer as part of the graduation
was necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause" under Lee
and Santa Fe.275 For the reasons I have discussed above, the Ninth Cir-
267. ELY, supra note 6, at 137.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320
F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003) (reaching the same result in a similar case on the basis of the decision in
Cole); Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Colo. 2008) (affirming
the decision of a school principal, pursuant to school district policy, punishing a student
valedictorian for delivering an address with religious content without first obtaining school
officials' approval of the religious portion of the speech).
271. Cole, 228 F.3d at 1096.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 1096-97.
275. Id. at 1101.
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cuit was clearly right as to Cole, whose selection was part of a process in
which a majority of students openly voted on a religious invocation. But
the panel also held that Niemeyer's sectarian speech would be impermis-
sible, despite the fact that the selection process was based on neutral
criteria, because "the District's plenary control over the graduation cere-
mony ... ma[de] it apparent Niemeyer's speech would have borne the
imprint of the District." '276 It described Niemeyer's desire to give a sec-
tarian address as falling afoul of "[t]he requirement that religion be left
to the private sphere." '277
Here, I think, the Ninth Circuit erred. One might question whether
Niemeyer ought to have given an openly sectarian address on an occa-
sion that "belonged as much to the other students and their families as to
himself." '278 But the Establishment Clause does not require a non-secta-
rian speech in such circumstances, any more than the Speech Clause
requires speech that pleases everyone. As Ely suggests, and as Madison
confirms, it simply requires a fair process, in which the game is unrig-
ged in the majority's favor and anyone can stand before the class as
valedictorian or salutatorian. Whatever basic content control the school
district retained over the students' speeches, the Establishment Clause
did not require the school to strip the speeches of sectarian content, any
more than the school should have been permitted to exclude a valedicto-
rian who wanted to talk in a minimally civil manner about health care or
the arms race.
Because nothing in the selection process implicated the concerns
raised in a case like Santa Fe or Adler, the Establishment Clause should
not have been read as permitting the school to silence Niemeyer. A pro-
cess-oriented view of graduation prayer thus suggests that it is possible
for schools to go too far in restricting sectarian prayers at graduation
ceremonies, provided that such speeches are the result of a process in
which all are genuinely eligible to give a message of their choosing.
This belies the Adler court's fear that striking down Duval County's
policy, as it should have done, would "effectively ban[] all religious
speech at school graduations." '279
Thus far, I have argued that Ely's political process-oriented theory
helps sort between permissible and impermissible processes for selecting
student graduation speakers, and that the distinction turns on whether the
process is genuinely fair or whether it employs the machinery of
276. Id. at 1103.
277. Id. at 1104.
278. Brady, supra note 9, at 1175; see also Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious
Expression at High School Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society, 5
NEXUS 61, 78-79 (2000).
279. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd. (Adler IV), 250 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001),
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majoritarian elections to rig the game in favor of the religious majority
without leaving any meaningful protection or recourse for minority
views. Let me close this section by considering the writing of Professor
Kathleen Brady, who argues thoughtfully that this distinction is insuffi-
cient. Brady asserts that the public-private dichotomy is "too simplistic
for the public school setting" because "most of the disputes in the public
school context concern speech that is neither purely public nor purely
private."28 Brady suggests that a significant amount of student religious
speech in public schools constitutes "[g]rey area speech" that "is both
partly private and partly public, and, thus, should be approached as a
distinct category of speech requiring unique treatment."' 28'
Brady proposes two "baseline principles" to address "grey area
religious speech," principles that she argues "strike[ ] a workable bal-
ance between the benefits of grey area religious expression and the pres-
ervation of Establishment Clause values." '282 The first principle states
that "when student religious expression is entirely student-initiated and
the school has not taken any action to provide the opportunity for relig-
ious speech, the expression should receive the same protections that sec-
ular speech does. '28 3 This principle I find unproblematic; it is certainly
consistent with everything we have seen so far.
The second baseline principle suggests "that schools can design and
provide an opportunity for student religious expression at graduations or
other school-related events as long as the school's policy provides an
equal opportunity for nonreligious speech and the school's policy is
scrupulously neutral and fair among different religious perspectives. 284
The purpose of the principle "is to permit the school to initiate an oppor-
tunity for students from a variety of backgrounds to engage in religious
and nonreligious expression at school-related events and in other grey
"1285area settings. Brady argues that a policy of "set[ting] aside a handful
of slots for inspirational messages and randomly select[ed] student vol-
unteers to fill these slots" will be constitutionally permissible "[i]f the
composition of the community is diverse.2 86 Where the school district
population is not religiously diverse, Brady proposes that the school
could "provide for a few broad categories like Protestant, Catholic, Jew-
ish, Muslim, other religion, and nonreligious, and ask student volunteers
280. Brady, supra note 9, at 1151-52.
281. Id. at 1152.
282. Id. at 1225.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1227.
285. Id. at 1227-28.
286. Id. at 1228.
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to identify themselves with one of these categories." '87 She acknowl-
edges that not every belief will be represented in any given year, but
suggests that the result will still be permissible if it provides "a broadly
inclusive and diverse group of voices. '"288 Even under this policy, how-
ever, she would permit schools to review the content of the speeches "to
ensure that [the speech] is appropriate for the occasion, relevant to the
school's pedagogical objectives, and civil and respectful to other stu-
dents. '289 This includes a potential restriction on some forms of
"proselytizing speech. 29° She would, for instance, allow the school to
prevent a student like Chris Niemeyer from delivering an openly secta-
rian and proselytizing speech at graduation. 9' Such speech, she says, is
"not purely private," and the school thus has "an interest in and an obli-
gation to ensure that Establishment Clause principles are also
preserved.
292
Brady's examination of these issues is the most sensitive and thor-
ough that I have seen in the scholarship on student graduation prayer.
Commendable as it is, however, I think it is also mistaken. From an
Elysian perspective, that might be because, despite its reference to
"equal opportunity" and "neutral and fair" selection processes, 293
Brady's approach is too focused on outcome and not focused enough on
process. Her proposal is intended to ensure that graduations feature a
wide diversity of religious and nonreligious views. But despite its valua-
ble aims, it gives the school too much discretion to shape a choir of
views, and I think the result will ultimately satisfy no one. Schools are
not well-situated to provide for genuine diversity of religious or nonreli-
gious views, and the experience with a variety of school districts, includ-
ing those in Santa Fe and Duval County, suggests that they are likely to
load the deck in a way that pays lip service to diversity while favoring
particular groups.
Even if they do not, it is unlikely that they can be completely
diverse. As Brady acknowledges, some students will still be left out.
That is not a problem in and of itself; a selection process based on aca-
demic standing also may not guarantee that every view is heard either.
But the process will be genuinely fair, and students whose views happen
to be left out in a given year will have far less reason to feel slighted or
coerced. That is less true for Brady's proposal. Indeed, while Brady
287. Id. at 1229.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1230.
290. Id. at 1231.
291. See id. at 1231-32.
292. Id. at 1235.
293. Id. at 1227.
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argues that a process that guarantees a reasonably diverse set of views
will remove the threat of coercion, from the audience's perspective a
process that uses the school's power to impose a particular suite of
views, no matter how diverse it may be or how well-meaning the school
officials are, may seem even more coercive. Rather than preserve the
shared public/private nature that Brady says characterizes grey area stu-
dent religious speech, the proposal she offers, by giving so much power
to schools to shape the content of graduation speech, tends to push this
speech into the public, and thus impermissible, category.
At the same time that it ensures diverse religious and nonreligious
student speech, albeit by means of a process that I have suggested is
ultimately improper, Brady's proposal also sacrifices too much religious
speech. If student religious speech, even of a sectarian or proselytizing
nature, results from a genuinely fair and neutral process, it is not the
school's business to restrict it. A student who is given an opportunity to
speak based on a genuinely fair process-one based on academic stand-
ing, for example-should not be censored just because she wishes to
give a speech that actually has bite and content, even if it might alienate
some of the audience. That is just as true if the speech is religious in
nature as if it were political or ideological in nature (if such a distinction
is even tenable). From behind the veil of ignorance, what the students
should care about is that any view is equally likely to be aired; if that is
true, then any fairness concerns are satisfied, both for the "winners" and
the "losers," and the speech should not be subject to censorship.
Perhaps schools should retain some degree of minimal control over
the content of the speech based on relatively neutral concerns such as a
desire to avoid profanity, and perhaps they should consider using dis-
claimers in their graduation programs; but their power should not extend
to a more substantive authority to regulate the content of religious or
nonreligious speech. Conversely, students are not obliged to offer secta-
rian or proselytizing speech, and they might well wish to consider the
"etiquette" of doing so.2 9 4 In this case, however, a rule of law should not
be drawn from a rule of etiquette. Provided that the process is genuinely
fair in an Elysian sense, as it was not in Adler, the fact that student
religious speech is proselytizing in nature should not preclude its inclu-
sion in a graduation ceremony.
In sum, an Elysian, political process-oriented examination of stu-
dent religious speech at graduation ceremonies helps us understand why
the majoritarian election process used by Duval County in Adler is con-
stitutionally problematic, and it helps us sort between various cases, see-
294. See generally Brownstein, supra note 278; see id. at 61 (commenting "on the clash of
values presented in these cases from a more personal and non-constitutional perspective").
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ing why a case like Madison is rightly decided and a case like Cole
wrongly decided. It also suggests that proposals like Brady's, which
attempt to secure sound substantive outcomes without sufficient concern
for fair processes, are ultimately mistaken. But Brady's discussion, with
its deep concern for the differences between school districts that are gen-
uinely diverse and those in which "one or more religions predominate[ ]
or secularism predominates," '295 directs our attention to an important
problem. It is that problem to which I finally turn.
C. Demographics and Distrust: What "Footnote One" Tells Us
About Public Religion in Overwhelmingly Homogeneous
Political Districts
The last section of this Article argued that Adler and Santa Fe,
viewed through the lens of political process theory, can be instructive on
the constitutional wrongs wrought by majoritarian selection processes
for student prayers at graduation ceremonies. Implicit, perhaps, in this
discussion has been a broader suggestion that Elysian theory can say
something about the uses to which majoritarian processes can be put,
and the occasions on which majority rule can be used in ways that
entrench the majority and disserve the minority. Thus, it says something
about the ways in which majoritarian processes, understood from an
Elysian perspective, can violate the Establishment Clause or other con-
stitutional provisions.
In this final section, I want to examine a still broader question
raised by Adler and Santa Fe as supplemented by Ely's political process
theory. The question I want to examine here has to do with the "size" of
constitutional decisions, particularly with respect to the Establishment
Clause. This is a question that Ely himself does not raise directly.
Although others have famously applied a political process theory of their
own to the subject of the role of the courts in mediating between differ-
ent levels of government,296 Ely himself has little to say about how his
political process theory relates to the broader question of federalism and
the Constitution.297 Ely does suggest at one point that one of the minor-
ity-protecting devices of the original Constitution was its effort to sepa-
rate and divide power both within the federal government (what we call
295. Brady, supra note 9, at 1228.
296. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
297. See Daniel D. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 721, 721 n.3 (1991) (noting that Ely "does not much discuss the theory"
of federalism).
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separation of powers) and "between the national government and the
states."'2 98 And he notes, crucially for present purposes, that "[t]he fact
that effective majorities can usually be described as clusters of cooperat-
ing minorities won't be much help when the cluster in question has suf-
ficient power and perceived community of interest to advantage itself at
the expense of a minority (or group of minorities) it is inclined to regard
as different."2 99 But for the most part he addresses himself to the Consti-
tution's "frontal assault on the problem of majority tyranny"-partic-
ularly the Bill of Rights, both as applied to the federal government and,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, against the states as well. One will
find no index reference for "federalism," "localism," or "municipalities"
in Democracy and Distrust-surprisingly, perhaps, for a book that pur-
ports to offer a complete theory of judicial review and the Constitution.
Certainly, Ely's discussion of the Religion Clauses themselves con-
tains no meaningful discussion of the varying role that might be played
by different levels of government in protecting religious freedom.3" 1
Whether his representation-reinforcement theory of the Constitution
applies directly to the Religion Clauses or whether, at least in Ely's own
view, those clauses are better viewed as a primarily substantive guaran-
tee, he has nothing to say about the relevance of the size of the govern-
mental entities that might violate the Religion Clauses. Until recently,
few others had taken up this question either.
That may have something to do with a particular popular vision of
religion's place in American society. That vision assumes that the
United States is a deeply, perhaps uniquely, religiously pluralistic soci-
ety.3°2 It treats the United States as a meeting ground and melting pot for
a rich diversity of religious and nonreligious views. That picture tends to
focus more on the sheer number of faiths at large in America and not on
the majority status of any one or more of those faiths. Moreover, it tends
to treat the United States as an undifferentiated whole, in which Ameri-
cans of a variety of faiths (or no faith), from the tip of Alaska to the far
reaches of the Florida Keys, meet in a single public square.
There is something to this picture, of course. In substantial part,
ours is a religiously pluralistic society. In some areas of the country-
298. ELY, supra note 6, at 80.
299. Id. at 81.
300. Id. at 82.
301. Ely notes in an aside that the Free Exercise Clause suggested that the framers wanted to
put religion "significantly beyond the reach of at least the federal government." Id. at 94. But he
does not build on the "at least."
302. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause,
67 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1991); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Si~cle
Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 330 (2000).
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particularly urban areas-we may experience at a microcosmic level
something of the religious diversity of the country writ large. But the
picture can also be dangerously misleading. Although we may partici-
pate in national politics and discussion, we also, and most directly, live
and participate in local communities-states, cities, suburbs, and towns.
That fact can have important implications for our understanding of the
Religion Clauses.
Recently, a number of scholars have begun paying increased atten-
tion to this question. They have begun to "conceptualize," as Richard
Schragger puts it, "the role of the local in the doctrine and discourse of
religious liberty. 3 °3 These treatments arrive at varying conclusions, but
they share in common a desire to complicate the simple picture of a
single, unified religiously pluralistic American society, and to consider
the role that different levels of government might play under the Relig-
ion Clauses.
Richard Schragger's rich account is especially worth examining.
Schragger notes that although many scholars have examined the degree
to which "America's extraordinary religious pluralism" is the result of
majority-restraining principles of religious freedom, relatively few have
paid attention "to the location and institutional character of these majori-
ties." 30 4 Despite the breadth of Religion Clause principles in the abstract,
in practice "modern Religion Clause jurisprudence has been to a signifi-
cant degree a product of religious conflicts within smaller polities."3 °5
Indeed, Schragger argues, "the American experiment in pluralism is
only truly tested under conditions of urbanity."30 6 When religious groups
take to the frontiers or to insular communities, they need face no threat
from others; only when they are competing for scarce resources in a
finite space do religious groups run afoul of each other.
Schragger argues that the received wisdom about "the role of the
local" in American religious liberty assumes that local political institu-
tions are parochial, "often hostile to religious minorities[,] and therefore
particularly in need of central oversight-judicial or otherwise. ' 30 7 By
contrast, Schragger argues that "local government-and more generally
303. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1813 (2004). For other examinations of this question, see for
example Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 77 (2007); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19 (2006); Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism,
and Federalism, 78 Cm.-KErr L. REV. 669 (2003).
304. Schragger, supra note 303, at 1812.
305. Id. at 1813.
306. Id. at 1814.
307. Id. at 1815; see also id. at 1820-21 ("The conventional wisdom is that local governments
are more likely than the national government to engage in religion-based discrimination or
2009l
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the decentralization of power-is a robust structural component of relig-
ious liberty."3 8 This is so for two reasons. First, government cannot
overreach in a system in which political authority is dispersed. Second,
local governments, by serving as "valuable sites of civic association,"
can "serve as counterweights to private religious power. '30 9 On these
two bases, he argues that Religion Clause jurisprudence should "be more
skeptical of federal and state regulations that touch on religion than of
similar local regulations."'3 10 Thus, the Court should "embrace a nuanced
approach ... that is attentive to the institutional location of any particu-
lar religion-burdening or -benefiting activity."31' With respect to the
"regulation of government-sponsored religious expression," he argues
that the Supreme Court's concern with the expressive harms wrought by
such expression-a concern that is evident in the endorsement and coer-
cion tests and their application in Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe-is
"overblown," and that "local communities should have room to permit
the public expression of religiously grounded values. 31 2
Schragger is by no means completely skeptical of the received wis-
dom. He agrees that "some locals can be hostile to minority religions or
to nonbelievers and that this hostility can generate serious exclusionary
harms to individual dissenters, especially in those communities domi-
nated by a single religious group."'3 1 3 Nonetheless, he questions the con-
ventional account, arguing that "[t]he problem of overt religious bigotry
in local settings is less relevant today" than it was just a few decades
ago.3 14 And he worries that the endorsement test, if applied insensitively
to local governmental entities, has the potential to do as much harm as
good. First, he thinks that local religious expression is "unlikely to gen-
erate a dangerous religious faction in the whole" polity. 315 Second, he
argues that local government speech is less likely to be persuasive "in a
religiously pluralistic society," and that practices that favor a particular
religious group are likely to dissipate as locales grow more diverse.316
Finally, he worries that too constraining a rule for local governments
may erode the health and vitality of local government, which he believes
favoritism .... [S]mall-scale polities are more likely to be afflicted by the scourge of faction;
religious bigotry finds legislative expression more easily where stable majorities can form.").
308. Id. at 1815.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1818-19.
312. Id. at 1820.
313. Id. at 1880.
314. Id. at 1822.
315. Id. at 1881.
316. Id. at 1882.
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to be vital for the proper functioning of a democratic state.3" 7
Schragger is not a wild-eyed optimist about all local governments,
but he believes that an approach to the Religion Clauses that emphasizes
greater deference to local government decisions will "facilitate[ ] the sal-
utary dispersal of political authority that serves to prevent any one belief
system from dominating the whole" and "buttresses the local civic com-
munity as a counterweight to religious privatism."31 8 Even within this
approach, he argues that there must be some restraints on what local
governments can do by way of religious expression.319 Nonetheless, his
approach on the whole casts doubt on the prevailing constitutional
approach to local government religious expression, and would expand
the field of permissible local governmental religious speech.
There is a great deal to admire in Schragger's account, although I
will bend it toward somewhat different conclusions. I have argued else-
where that the Court should take account of the different institutional
roles of the varying actors within First Amendment jurisprudence;
although my account focuses on private or semi-private institutions such
as churches, universities, and libraries rather than on government regula-
tors themselves, I still agree with Schragger on this general point.32 °
And Schragger's argument that "the American experiment in pluralism
is only truly tested under conditions of urbanity" is essential and too
often overlooked, although I will use it for different ends below.3 2'
In short, I am sympathetic to the general ambition of Schragger and
other scholars to focus on the nature and scale of various actors, public
or private, when considering the proper scope of the Religion Clauses;
as I have said, my own work on "First Amendment institutions" can be
viewed as a small part of this movement.3 22 But neither am I entirely
ready to give up on the conventional account of the dangers of granting
too much deference to local government when it comes to religious
expression, particularly in a forum such as the public schools. Although
Schragger acknowledges that there must be some genuine constraints on
317. See id. at 1887-88.
318. Id. at 1891.
319. See id. at 1890 (arguing that local governments cannot engage in "nonneutral or
discriminatory financial or political support," and that religious expression by local governments
must occur "within the terms of public democratic discourse-a discourse of equal concern and
respect").
320. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 235; Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 461 (2005); Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers
and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1061 (2008).
321. Schragger, supra note 303, at 1814.
322. See Horwitz, supra note 235 (applying First Amendment institutionalism to religious
entities); see also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008).
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local governmental actors, his dismissal of the expressive harm argu-
ment, and his generous description of local governments as nomic com-
munities that compete for allegiance and attention with a host of "other
private and public entities," '323 gives too little weight to the threat local
governments may pose to religious minorities.
This threat arises precisely from the point Schragger makes: that
"the American experiment in pluralism is only truly tested under condi-
tions of urbanity." '324 Although the conventional picture of American
religion is one of extraordinary diversity, demographically speaking the
United States is less like a religious melting pot and more like a bowl of
oatmeal: it's lumpy. In some pockets, such as major urban centers, the
diversity of religious views is such that any single faction is less likely
to prevail at the local level. In those areas, perhaps counter-intuitively,
the very fact of potential religious strife is more likely to lead to broad
accommodations between and among all the players.325 In many other
areas, however, a single religious group is far more likely to
predominate overwhelmingly over any religious minorities.
If those areas were wholly homogeneous-if there were simply no
one with a minority religious viewpoint in those jurisdictions-then all
of Schragger's arguments for deference to local religious authorities
might apply, and deference to local governmental decisions concerning
religious expression might be understandable. But they are almost never
(if ever) wholly religiously homogeneous; they are just overwhelmingly
religiously homogeneous. Those are precisely the conditions in which
Schragger's fears that the local government, when speaking religiously,
might engage in "nonneutral or discriminatory financial or political sup-
port" for a particular faith and against others, or might violate conditions
of "equal concern and respect" for religious minorities, are most likely
to arise.32 6 And, if my description of the demographics of religious
diversity in America as a lumpy affair is right, then it is a pattern that is
likely to recur again and again in local governmental entities, including
school districts and individual schools, across the country. In those cir-
cumstances, Schragger's argument that "the benefits [for] local diver-
sity" of a "decentralized approach" to the Establishment Clause may
outweigh "the potentially significant costs to individual dissenters" is
323. Schragger, supra note 303, at 1882.
324. Id. at 1814.
325. Although this point will not always hold true. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 249, at
41-42 (discussing Bronx Household of Faith v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
2007), a case in which the New York City Board of Education has labored to exclude a religious
group from enjoying equal access to school facilities on weekends).
326. Schragger, supra note 303, at 1890.
[Vol. 63:835
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DISTRUST
less likely to hold true. 327
At this point, it is worth filling in the picture by asking just what
local government action in overwhelmingly religiously homogeneous
political districts looks like. There is no better place to start than with
Santa Fe itself. Just as Ely helped to burnish the fame of "Footnote
Four" in the Carolene Products case, so I want to suggest that, for stu-
dents of the Establishment Clause, Santa Fe's "Footnote One" should
become equally famous. In that footnote, the Court noted that, a month
after the anonymous complaint in the Doe case was filed, the district
court found it necessary to enter an order barring
any further attempt on the part of [the school] District or school
administration, officials, counsellors, teachers, employees or servants
of the School District, parents, students or anyone else, overtly or
covertly to ferret out the identities of the Plaintiffs in this cause, by
means of bogus petitions, questionnaires, individual interrogation, or
downright 'snooping[.]' [Such attempts] will cease immediately.328
Unlike Carolene Products' Footnote Four, which is widely known,
Santa Fe's Footnote One is, alas, generally excised from most of the
constitutional law casebooks, including those focusing on the First
Amendment or law and religion. This is a mistake. It is impossible to
fully appreciate the Court's decision in Santa Fe without knowing this
piece of the case's history. 9 Moreover, Footnote One speaks broadly to
the status of minority religions in overwhelmingly religiously homoge-
neous local political districts such as public schools. It tells us that
where a majority religion seeks to entrench itself through public-spon-
sored religious expression, even where it does so through the tactic of
majoritarian election processes, public and private intimidation of the
objecting religious minority is sure to follow.
Indeed, the case law and literature are rife with examples of this
kind of conduct. 33 ° In one such case, a family that objected to public
prayer at a public school in an overwhelmingly Southern Baptist region
of Mississippi was subjected to both public and private harassment; as
an example of the former, a teacher "made one child wear headphones to
avoid hearing the offending prayers."33' In another case, a Jewish family
in Pike County, Alabama, filed suit objecting to various religious exer-
327. Id. at 1891.
328. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294-95 n.1 (2000).
329. For more on the harassment of the plaintiffs in Santa Fe, and other students in that
district, see Laycock, supra note 249, at 38-40.
330. The best account is that of Frank Ravitch. See RAVITCH, supra note 10; see also Frank S.
Ravitch, A Crack in the Wall: Pluralism, Prayer, and Pain in the Public Schools, in LAW AND
RELIGION: A CRrMCAL ANTHOLOGY 296, 296 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
331. RAvrrcH, supra note 10, at 9.
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cises conducted by the local public schools; one of the children was
physically forced by a school official to bow his head during Christian
prayers, and a minister at a school assembly told the students that those
who did not accept Jesus as their savior "were doomed to hell. 332 In a
third case, a Jewish high school student in Utah who objected to the
singing of religious songs by the high school choir, to which she
belonged, was spat on by audience members and was identified as Jew-
ish by one of her teachers.333 In an extreme case, two families who
objected to religious meetings held at a primary school in a small town
in Oklahoma received death threats, and one family's house was burned
down, in addition to their suffering from petty acts of harassment by
school employees.334
These are only a few examples. 335 No doubt there are examples of
both public and private intimidation of religious minorities in similar
circumstances in towns too obscure to gain national attention. It is
likely, too, that the threat or reality of intimidation has in some cases
choked off any objections to particular majoritarian religious practices
by religious minorities before they ever reached the stage of formal pro-
tests or litigation. Not incidentally, one account of the Adler litigation
itself suggests a similar dynamic of intimidation at work. When one of
the Adler children sat through the prayers at her graduation, a classmate
told her, "Stand up, you stupid bitch. 336
I hasten to add that the point of this list is not to be alarmist, or to
ignore the locales in which no such intimidation occurred. Nor am I
arguing by implication for some form of strict separationism across the
board in Establishment Clause cases. The concerns raised by this sort of
conduct may not be raised by other government actions, such as funding
for religious entities, that take place on a fair and neutral basis.337 They
332. Id. at 9-10.
333. See id. at 11-12.
334. See id. at 12-13.
335. For these and other examples, see also Smith, supra note 54, at 328-29 (adding the
example of a student who was called a "little atheist" during class by one teacher for objecting to
prayer by a school basketball coach at games and practices, and a student who was "lectured on
Christianity" for objecting to a school's practice of offering invocations at football games);
Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Schools? A Discussion of Religion's Role in the
Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 609-14 (1995).
336. Blumer, supra note 168.
337. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the
Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 507-08 (1992) (arguing that battles
over the government use of religious symbols are more polarizing than battles over the allocation
of government resources to religion); Lupu, supra note 148, at 771 (noting that the "emerging
trend" in Establishment Clause litigation is "away from concern over government transfers of




will likely also be absent in cases of true private religious speech involv-
ing willing audiences, such as the use of school rooms for meetings by
religious groups before or after school hours on an equal basis with non-
religious groups.338 Moreover, and the point is particularly relevant here,
one cannot easily argue for an across-the-board separationist rule
because the nature, scope, and likelihood of this kind of majority harass-
ment of minorities will vary depending on the size and demographic
makeup of the political district in question. Schragger's general point
about "the importance of scale" in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
quite correct, although I do not believe it always points in the direction
of deference to local governmental officials.339
The conclusion I have drawn in this section is ultimately a simple
one, although it may often be overlooked in law and religion scholar-
ship. For all our rhapsodies over American religious pluralism, 340 it is
important to remember that American religious pluralism writ large is
not at all the same thing as American religious pluralism writ small. If it
were-if local political jurisdictions were every bit as religiously
diverse as the national polity-perhaps a different approach would be
appropriate.34' Courts and scholars have often worried about the effects
of religious "division" or "strife. ' 342 But, in genuinely religiously plural-
istic political jurisdictions, these divisions are likely to result in compro-
mise among all the players rather than the dominance of any one group.
Even if there is discord along the way, no single faction is likely to win,
and the political process is more likely to find ways of hearing from and
accommodating everyone. Both the process and the outcome are thus
likely to be fairer and more neutral in an Elysian sense.
This is not true, however, in overwhelmingly religiously homoge-
neous political districts. There, both the process and the outcome are
338. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
339. Schragger, supra note 303, at 1817.
340. And I do mean "our." See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 250 (discussing American religious
pluralism in the context of religion and American presidential politics).
341. I emphasize the word "perhaps." How we treat government religious expression that takes
place at the national level, or that is imposed locally through decisions made at the national
political level, is beyond the scope of this Article. My general sense, however, is that at a de facto
level we already often permit or excuse religious expression by national political figures, such as
public prayer at presidential inauguration ceremonies, both because those actions do not involve
the imposition of government religious expression on locally gathered bodies of citizens, and
because the few occasions on which national political figures speak religiously are far more non-
coercive in nature than they would be at the local level. For some related musings on similar
questions, see William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in
Moments of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 11 (2002).
342. For a comprehensive and critical examination of the role of concerns over religious
"division" in Religion Clause jurisprudence, see Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the
First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006).
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likely to permanently favor the majority, and to disenfranchise the
minority-if not worse, as the laundry list of examples of public and
private harassment offered above suggests. Because the demographics of
religion in those districts overwhelmingly favor a particular group, the
process is unlikely to create a shifting cast of "ins" and "outs"; the ins
will always be in, and the outs will always be out. It cannot be surpris-
ing, then, that it is precisely at the local level, and specifically at the
level of overwhelmingly religiously homogeneous political jurisdictions,
that the Supreme Court's rulings on school prayer have been most
openly defied.343
This in turn suggests a somewhat contrarian, but important, conclu-
sion. Although the implications of this conclusion remain to be worked
out more fully in subsequent work, it is worth spelling out here, albeit
tentatively. In recent years, some judges 34 4 and scholars3 45 have argued
that the Establishment Clause may best be understood as being solely or
primarily concerned with federal establishments of religion, and not
state or local establishments of religion. For other reasons, as we have
seen, similar implications may follow from the arguments of localist
scholars like Richard Schragger. The argument I have offered in this
section suggests a different conclusion: the Establishment Clause might
instead be better understood, at least in the modem era, as being more
properly concerned with state and local establishments of religion than
with federal establishments of religion.
One possible response to this conclusion is that exit is possible
from state and local jurisdictions in a way that it is not at the national
level. Indeed, defenders of the localist approach to the Establishment
Clause often point to the availability of exit in defending their
approach.346 I acknowledge the force of this argument, and a full
response to this point may have to await another occasion. Still, I want
to venture some tentative responses. First, I am not so sure that exit is
always as easy or available in practice as this argument would suggest.
343. See, e.g., FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
OF CHURCH AND STATE 296-300 (Princeton Univ. Press 1976); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and
Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 608 (1993); Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme
Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1984);
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv.
1, 15-16 (1996) (suggesting that the Court's school prayer decisions reflected national majority
sentiment and were thus imposed primarily against local outliers, but noting that the school prayer
rulings may have been "defied in many locales"); Stephen J. Wermiel, Appointment Controversies
and the Supreme Court, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1990).
344. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-50 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment).
345. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843 (2006).
346. See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 303, at 1848; Rosen, supra note 303, at 703-07.
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As Douglas Laycock and others have pointed out, "Voting with your
feet is expensive." ''  Second, even if exit from smaller jurisdictions is
somewhat available, the high costs of exit at a local level must be taken
into account in weighing the costs and benefits of a "jurisdictional" or
decentralized approach to the Establishment Clause.34 8 Third, as I have
argued above, even if exit is not available at the national level, the fact
of significant religious pluralism at the national level means that exit is
also less necessary at that level, since any single religious faction is less
likely to prevail in the national political process than it is at the local
level. Thus, even given the argument from exit, it may still be the case
that the Establishment Clause ought, on balance, to be more concerned
with state and local establishments of religion than with federal
establishments.
Finally, the argument from exit may not be a trump where individ-
ual rights are involved.3 49 As Laycock writes, there is a difference
between "those cases in which a person leaves the jurisdiction in
response to illegitimate pressures [and] those cases in which a person
leaves the jurisdiction in response to legitimate policy disagree-
ments. 35 ° I have argued in this Article that practices of overwhelmingly
religiously homogeneous political jurisdictions that entrench the ins, and
dislodge the outs, on a religious basis fall within the former category. To
be sure, that argument is a substantive one.351 My conclusion may thus
seem to be in some tension with the conventional view that Elysian
political process theory is supposed to be utterly substance-free.35 2 But it
is doubtful that Ely can be properly read as having disclaimed any such
substantive choices,3 53 and the view I have developed in this Article is
that religious freedom, including non-establishment, is one such sub-
stantive choice that fits properly within Ely's theory.
Ely himself had little or nothing to say about the relevance of the
"size" or "scale" of governmental actors in applying either political pro-
347. Laycock, supra note 249; see id. at 34 n.30 (collecting sources).
348. See Schragger, supra note 303, at 1891 (treating the question of whether to defer to local
religious practices as a matter of weighing the costs and benefits of such an approach).
349. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1992, at 147, 150 ("[T]he institution of federalism, without the rigorous
enforcement of substantive individual rights, will not be equal to the formidable task before it.");
Laycock, supra note 249, at 30-43.
350. Laycock, supra note 249, at 31.
351. See id. (noting that distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate instances of being
forced to exit, or "vot[e] with your feet," "reduces to a debate over which rights to
constitutionalize and over the proper scope of each constitutional right").
352. See Tushnet, supra note 229, at 1048-51; see id. at 1050 (arguing that Ely's theory, by
championing certain rights even where exit is a possibility, is "inconsistent with the principle of
value-free adjudication").
353. See generally Michelman, supra note 232.
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cess theory in general or the Religion Clauses in particular. Still, the
arguments I have offered above seem wholly consistent with his theory.
The machinery of the political process is especially likely to malfunction
in overwhelmingly religiously homogeneous political jurisdictions. In
sum, contrary to some localist and "jurisdictional" arguments about the
Establishment Clause, and consistently with a proper reading of the facts
in Adler and Santa Fe-and especially that case's Footnote One, which
ought to be far better known by law and religion scholars-perhaps we
ought to be especially vigilant and rigorous in applying the Establish-
ment Clause to these sorts of political subdivisions. In opposition to
some of the arguments raised not only by localists but by champions of
the "jurisdictional" reading of the Establishment Clause, like Justice
Thomas and Steven Smith, this Article might thus also be viewed as an
initial sally in support of what we might call the "counter-jurisdictional"
Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
This Article has been, in large measure, about why the Eleventh
Circuit was wrong in Adler v Duval County. But it is not only about that.
For all that the court's opinion in Adler was wrong, that case, and Santa
Fe too, reveal much more when viewed through an Elysian lens. Under-
standing the majoritarian speaker selection policies in Adler and Santa
Fe as providing for a rigged political process, in an Elysian sense, helps
us understand more clearly why unconstitutional state purposes cannot
be laundered by running them through a democratic dumb show. More
broadly, Adler and Santa Fe offer insights about the nature of American
religious pluralism, and the dangers of assuming that it exists on a local
as well as a national scale. These cases suggest that the localists are right
to believe that courts and scholars have paid insufficient attention to the
scale of government action in Establishment Clause cases. They also
suggest, however, that sometimes, in some overwhelmingly religiously
homogeneous areas, the local can be more of a threat to religious liberty
than the national. For these reasons, too, Adler is important even if it is
mistaken.
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